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I. INTRODUCTION
In describing how a misdeed’s foul reputation could herald one’s
own demise, President Abraham Lincoln remarked that “[w]hat kills
the skunk is the publicity it gives off.”1  Senator Frank Church, like
President Lincoln, believed that corrupt practices generally attract
ample attention on their own.  Indeed, in 1974 the stench of various
reports of misconduct involving the intelligence agencies necessitated
a thorough investigation by the government.2
Congress created a congressional committee charged with unveiling
wrongdoing by the reticent intelligence agencies. Church optimisti-
cally strategized that if he could lead such a committee, he and his
staff would discover misdeeds that would prompt drastic reform for
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1. JAMES C. HUMES, THE WHIT AND WISDOM OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 10 (2009).
2. LEROY ASHBY & ROD GRAMER, FIGHTING THE ODDS: THE LIFE OF SENA-
TOR FRANK CHURCH 470–71 (1994).
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intelligence agencies when such findings were made public.3  Indeed,
Church and his leadership as chairman of the Senate’s first intelli-
gence activities committee drastically altered Americans’ perceptions
of their own government by bringing public attention to shocking gov-
ernment transgressions. He brought about significant reforms for the
intelligence agencies, including the creation of Congress’s permanent
oversight committees on intelligence activities.
Even when confronted by powerful critics who warned of dire con-
sequences resulting from the release of government and corporate
secrets, Church refused to be imbued with such sentiments.  Instead,
Church adhered to another doctrine altogether: “Our society . . . has
drawn its inspiration from the Biblical injunction, ‘Ye shall know the
truth and the truth shall make you free.’”4
This Article compares a historical model of congressional intelli-
gence oversight, as demonstrated by Church’s leadership as chairman
of the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities (“Church Committee”),
with current intelligence oversight deficiencies that have induced a
growing population of citizens to demand greater protections against
government overreach and wrongdoing.5  By examining the difficul-
ties Church and the Church Committee experienced in gathering evi-
dence of government misconduct and publicly disseminating such
3. Id. at 472 (citing James Barron & Marjorie Arons, The Flexible Liberalism of
Frank Church, BOSTON PHOENIX, Nov. 18, 1975; Interview by Rod Gramer with
Frank Church (June 24, 1979); Frank Church, Neither a Vendetta Nor a Whitewash
(Feb. 27, 1975) (transcript available in the Boise State University Library, Special
Collections & Archives in Frank Church Papers collection)).
4. Id. at 490 (quoting Typescript of Church’s statement in response to Ford’s Oct.
31, 1975 letter urging the suppression of the committee’s assassination report (tran-
script available in the Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives
in Frank Church Papers collection) (including handwritten notes)); see also ALBERT
BARNES, BARNES’ NOTES ON THE NEW TESTAMENT 307 (1962) (commenting the
aforementioned biblical quote from John 8:32:
The truth shall make you free.  The truth here means the Christian religion.
Compare Gal.[atians] [3]:1; Col.[ossians] [1]:6.  The doctrines of the true re-
ligion shall make you free.  That is, it will free you from the slavery of evil
passions, corrupt propensities, and grovelling views.  The condition of a sin-
ner is that of a captive or a slave to sin.  He is one who serves and obeys the
dictates of an evil heart and the promptings of an evil nature, Rom.[ans]
[6]:16-17, ‘Ye were the servants of sin;’ [Romans 6]:19, ‘Ye have yielded your
members servants unto iniquity;’ [Romans 6]:20; [Romans 7]:6, [Romans
7]:8, [Romans 7]:11; [Romans 8]:21; Acts [8]:23; ‘Thou art in the—bond of
iniquity;’ Gal.[atians 4]:3, Gal.[atians 4]:9.  The effect of the gospel is to
break this hard bondage to sin, and set the sinner free.  We learn from this
that religion is not slavery, or oppression.  It is true freedom.).
5. See Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on Skeptical Public: Most Say U.S.
Should Pursue Criminal Case Against Snowden, PEW RES. CTR FOR PEOPLE & PRESS
(Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/20/obamas-nsa-speech-has-little-
impact-on-skeptical-public/ [hereinafter Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on
Skeptical Public].
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information, a more historical perspective may reveal the viability of
alternative methods of congressional intelligence oversight.
At the time of this Article’s submission, the Central Intelligence
Agency had recently confirmed its use of cyber espionage on the U.S.
Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence (“Intelligence Commit-
tee”).6  Before the CIA confirmed the story, which broke in March
2014, the Intelligence Committee’s chairman, Democrat Senator Di-
anne Feinstein of California, on the Senate floor characterized the in-
cident as “a potential effort to intimidate [Congress]” and critical in
demonstrating “whether the Intelligence Committee can be effective
in monitoring and investigating our nation’s intelligence activities, or
whether our work can be thwarted by those we oversee.”7
Upon the CIA’s admission of improperly accessing the Intelligence
Committee’s computer network, Senator John McCain echoed
Church’s familiar line of questioning in asking the following question:
“What did the director of the CIA know and when did he know it?”8
McCain further criticized the CIA’s actions as being “clearly unconsti-
tutional” and “in some ways it’s worse than criminal.”9
The frustration, the sense of intimidation by the intelligence agen-
cies, and the fundamental questions raised about Congress’s difficult
role as a coequal branch of government tasked with overseeing the
intelligence agencies are familiar challenges faced by the Church
Committee, especially as it attempted to make the Intelligence Com-
mittee a permanent one.  Likewise, the public is once again eager for
transparency and reform following recent revelations of widespread
domestic surveillance.10
As newspapers continue to divulge blockbuster allegations detailing
pervasive domestic surveillance activities, there is a growing concern
among the public and politicians alike.11  Such stories advance a per-
ception now held by a majority of Americans, that of a distinct uneasi-
6. Niels Lesniewski, McCain: ‘What Did the Director of the CIA Know and When
Did He Know It?’, INSIDE THE WORLD’S GREATEST DELIBERATIVE BODY #WGDB
(Aug. 1, 2014, 12:31 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/mccain-what-did-the-director-
of-the-cia-know-and-when-did-he-know-it/?dcz=.
7. Mark Mazzetti & Jonathan Weismanmarch, Conflict Erupts in Public Rebuke
on C.I.A. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/03/12/us/cia-accused-of-illegally-searching-computers-used-by-senate-com-
mittee.html?_r=0. See also Lesniewski, supra note 6.
8. Lesniewski, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Susan Page, Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the NSA Program, USA TO-
DAY (Jan. 20, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/
poll-nsa-surveillance/4638551/.
11. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by C.I.A. Affirms It Spied on
Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/01/world/senate-intelligence-commitee-cia-interrogation-report.html?_r=0.
See also John Vidal & Suzanne Goldenberg, Snowden Revelations of NSA Spying on
Copenhagen Climate Talks Spark Anger: Documents Leaked by Edward Snowden
Show NSA Kept US Negotiators Abreast of Their Rivals’ Positions at 2009 Summit,
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ness regarding their privacy amidst revelations of rampant domestic
surveillance.12
Similarly in 1974, Seymour Hersh disclosed in the New York Times
some of the CIA’s most startling domestic operations conducted over
its past twenty-five years.13  Hersh’s report and the bombshell revela-
tions that followed, including additional developments on President
Richard Nixon’s connection to the Watergate burglary, are reminis-
cent of many of the current leaks detailing previously unknown wide-
spread domestic surveillance programs.14
A culmination of mistrust in government and the aftermath of
Watergate prompted President Gerald Ford to call for Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller to chair a blue-ribbon commission to investigate
such damaging allegations and to make formal recommendations for
course correction.  However, President Nixon’s actions during Water-
gate represented what Church described as “an aura of imperial infal-
libility.”15  Thus, the 94th Congress, held by a Democratic majority in
both the Senate and House of Representatives, eagerly challenged the
succeeding Republican President’s authority and audited the execu-
tive branch’s most secretive dealings.  Congress voted overwhelmingly
in both the House and the Senate to open their own respective investi-
gations into the nation’s intelligence agencies.16
Church convincingly lobbied for the chairmanship of the newly cre-
ated Church Committee.17  Unlike with standing committees, Senate
leadership enjoyed greater flexibility in selecting this special commit-
tee’s chair and composition based on preference rather than senior-
ity.18  Although Church was not the first choice, Senator Philip Hart’s
ongoing battle with cancer afforded Church the opportunity to chair
GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/
jan/30/snowden-nsa-spying-copenhagen-climate-talks.
12. Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on Skeptical Public, supra note 5.
13. NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 222,
GEORGE WASH. UNIV. (Thomas Blanton ed., 2007), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/.
14. Id. (describing how Mr. Hersh’s story lead to the CIA’s “Family Jewels” re-
port, which documented the agency’s illegal activities, and its public release with re-
dactions in 1977 and with fewer redactions in 2007.)
15. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 415 (citing Frank Church, Watergate and
the American Foreign Policy, Address at the University of Delaware (Nov. 19, 1973),
in 119 CONG. REC. 37,949–51 (1973)).
16. Id. at 471.
17. Id. at 472. (citing Interview by Donald Richie with George Tames, Washington
Photographer, N.Y. Times, (Jan. 13–May 16, 1988), available at https://www.senate.
gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/OralHistory_TamesGeorge.pdf).
18. See LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: CONGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE
17 (1988); UNITED STATES SENATE, Senate Committees, http://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm#3 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014); see
also 121 CONG. REC. 1417 (1975); Hearings on Oversight of U.S. Government Intelli-
gence Functions: Before the S. Comm. On Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong. 17–18 (1976)
(statement of Sen. Mike Mansfield, S. Majority Leader).
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the committee that would permanently alter the manner of congres-
sional intelligence oversight.19
Church, a Democrat from Idaho, chaired the Church Committee,
while John G. Tower, a Republican from Texas, served as Vice Chair-
man.  FThere were five additional Democrats served on the commit-
tee: Philip Hart of Michigan, Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, Walter
“Dee” Huddleston of Kentucky, Robert B. Morgan of North Caro-
lina, and Gary W. Hart of Colorado.  Likewise, Also on the commit-
tee were four additional Republicans served on the committee:
Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, Barry Goldwater of Arizona,
Charles M. Mathias Jr. of Maryland, and Richard S. Schweiker of
Pennsylvania.
Unfortunately for Church’s legacy, one of his contemporary oppo-
nents, Dick Cheney, now a former vice president but then a senior
staffer in the Nixon White House who went on to work in the Ford
White House, would advance an ideology diametrically opposed to
Church’s own vision.20  While Church epitomized vigilant congres-
sional oversight and longed for the intelligence agencies to act with far
greater restraint and adherence to the rule of law, Cheney successfully
manifested adherence to the concept of the “imperial presidency,”
“monarchical executive,” or “unitary executive.”21
Although Vice President Cheney’s consolidation of executive
power remains controversial and well-debated among legal scholars,
there is little doubt that the ideology he pursued, aided by his long-
serving legal advisor David Addington, empowered the Bush Admin-
istration to insulate its activities from the type of vigorous congres-
sional oversight and public disclosures analogously suffered by
Presidents Nixon and Ford.22  Even today, the Obama Administra-
tion’s challenge of distinguishing itself from the sweeping authorities
claimed by its preceding administration appears increasingly difficult
in light of reports and consistent leaks detailing sustained Bush Ad-
19. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 472; see also JOHNSON, supra note 18, at
14–15.
20. See Ford Administration Senior Staff, GERALD FORD FOUND., http://
www.geraldrfordfoundation.org/ford-alum/ford-administration-senior-staff/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2014).
21. FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBAL-
ANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 7, 157–58 (2008) (tracing the
evolution of the “unitary executive” theory to the modern “Monarchial Executive”
theory). See also SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra at 3, 50 (describing Aurthur Schlesinger’s
disparaging characterization of the Nixon Administration as “The Imperial
Presidency.”).
22. See David Addington: Cheney’s Powerful, One-Man Legal Office, FRONTLINE,
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/cheney/themes/adding
ton.html.
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ministration policies and programs, and in some cases even enhance-
ment under President Obama.23
In the flurried drama surrounding the leaks of classified information
by Edward Snowden, commentators are quick to invoke the Church
Committee in discussing the shocking details discovered and publicly
disseminated by Snowden.24  However, very few commentators detail
the Church Committee’s struggles to uncover and publicly release
information.
To many, the Church Committee’s success in embarrassing the in-
telligence community by publicly disclosing information and holding
public hearings on the government’s prior misdeeds exemplified stal-
wart congressional oversight.  Unfortunately, Congress could do noth-
ing to alleviate the damage already caused to those who had fallen
prey to government wrongdoing.
However, the Church Committee also represents a rare glimpse
into the largely uncharted constitutional issues surrounding Con-
gress’s role in overseeing the Executive’s intelligence activities.  As
many of these issues are resurfacing today, it is worthwhile to reexam-
ine the prior congressional debates regarding public disclosure of clas-
sified and sensitive information and the creation of the permanent
intelligence committees.  Likewise, while the intelligence agencies are
often perceived as meddling with Congress, the fear of Church turning
his committee into another Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities (“Watergate Committee”) aided the Church
Committee’s work.  Similarly, the Ford White House’s apprehension
of the Church Committee forcing the Judiciary to settle constitutional
questions related to Congress’s investigation and subpoena powers,
particularly of current executive officials and former President Nixon,
elicited astonishing cooperation.25
As the United States faces a critical juncture in determining the
proper role of government in its citizens’ lives, an examination of
Church’s sagacious philosophy and the Church Committee’s findings
are a persuasive alternative to the prevalent philosophy mandating ex-
ecutive deference and offering few protections against government
misconduct.  In comparison to the Church Committee, modern con-
23. See Glenn Greenwald, DOJ Kill List Memo Forces Many Dems Out of the
Closet as Overtly Unprincipled Hacks: Last Week’s Controversy Over Obama’s Assas-
sination Program Forced into Light Many Ignored Truths That Were Long Obvious,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/feb/11/progressives-defend-obama-kill-list. See also Jack Mirkinson, DOJ’s AP
Probe Helps Fuel Obama-Nixon Comparisons, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013,
08:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/15/obama-nixon-doj-ap-pentagon-
papers_n_3278303.html.
24. See Conor Friedersdorf, Lawbreaking at the NSA: Bring On a New Church
Committee, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2013, 06:34 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2013/08/lawbreaking-at-the-nsa-bring-on-a-new-church-committee/278750/.
25. See FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY 61 (2d ed.1994).
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gressional hearings display a level of deference to the executive
branch reminiscent of the congressional oversight hearings prior to
the Church Committee, a period between 1947–1974 that Professor
Loch K. Johnson described as the “Era of Trust” between Congress
and the intelligence agencies.26  While Loch Johnson considered the
Church Committee to have represented an “Era of Skepticism,” the
revelation of Iran-Contra Affair in 1986 converted the aptly named
“Era of Uneasy Partnership,” lasting from 1976–1986, into the mod-
ern “Era of Distrust.”27
This Article will explore the history of the Church Committee by
addressing some of the critical issues they faced and will provide a
background on Church, particularly those actions that significantly in-
fluenced his leadership of the Church Committee.  The analysis is
based on Church’s statements, various authors’ perspectives, and an
interview with Peter Fenn, one of Church’s former chiefs of staff and a
close friend of the Church family.
Of the various authors cited within this Article, two of the works,
one by LeRoy Ashby & Rod Gramer, Fighting the Odds: The Life of
Senator Frank Church, and the other by Professor Lock Johnson, A
season of inquiry: Congress and Intelligence, each captured unique as-
pects of both Church and the Church Committee in a superbly de-
tailed, well-written, and enthralling manner.  Professor Loch Johnson
and Peter Fenn’s review of this Article greatly aided its analysis and
played a tremendous role towards its completion.
Part II describes Church’s background, relevant political positions,
and role on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Pow-
ers, all of which greatly impacted his leadership on the Church
Committee.
Part III addresses the Church Committee’s challenges in gathering
and analyzing information from the executive branch in order to un-
cover wrongdoing.
Part IV examines the Church Committee’s success in navigating the
public release of extremely controversial government secrets despite
restrictions prohibiting a congressional committee from self-releasing
such information.
Part V posits how the legacy of Church and the Church Committee
could inspire another era of vigorous congressional intelligence
oversight.
26. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 257; see also Brian Jackson, Needed: Sustainable
Spying Oversight, US NEWS (Sept. 17, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opin-
ion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/17/the-nsa-and-intelligence-organizations-need-sustain
able-oversight.
27. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at xi–xii.
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II. SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: PARAGON OF OPPOSITION
Senator Frank Church served four terms in the U.S. Senate from
January 3, 1957, through January 3, 1981.28 Church’s age when first
elected, thirty-two, set him apart from many of his fellow senators,
whose average age was fifty-eight.29  He was even featured in newspa-
pers as the “baby” senator and often mistaken by capitol visitors for a
Senate page.30
Despite his young age, Church cultivated a formidable aptitude for
public speaking.  During World War II, he was awarded the Bronze
Star by General Robert B. McClure for his outstanding intelligence
briefings detailing enemy troop movements.31 Church’s Senate col-
leagues soon conferred on the former high school debator the title
“boy orator” following his impressive three-hour-long presentation
opposing a private dam to be built on the Oregon-Idaho border.32
Another critical component of Church’s legacy, one that greatly in-
fluenced his leadership on the Church Committee, was his demon-
strated temerity in opposing considerably more powerful political
rivals.  According to Peter Fenn, Church’s former chief of staff and
close friend of the late Senator’s family, two key events in Church’s
life contributed greatly to his independent character: “[A]fter serving
in W[orld] W[ar] II and escaping death when he had cancer in law
school Church was not hesitant to take risks, to take chances, to make
every day count.”33  Fenn recalls that “[i]f [Church] had not had can-
cer, he often said that he would have been more cautious in his politi-
cal career and probably not run for the U.S. Senate in 1956 at the age
of 32.”34
While campaigning for the Senate at such a young age is courageous
in its own right, an incident at the beginning of Church’s tenure imme-
diately tested his political courage.  Consider the following example of
Church’s willingness to confront powerful enemies: “Church, within
minutes after taking his oath of office, thus found himself in a ‘nose-
to-nose’ encounter with the majority leader.  [Senator Lyndon] John-
son, eyes narrowed, bore in relentlessly upon him, imploring his young
28. Church, Frank Foster, (1924–1984), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
C000388 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
29. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 73.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 80–81 (citing clippings of Smith’s and Nover’s comments, Frank Church
Papers (on file at Boise State University Library System, Special Collections &
Archives in Frank Church Papers collection)).
33. Id.; E-mail from Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Communications Group,
to Marc B. Langston, author of this article, (Feb. 12, 2014, 13:38 EST) (on file with
author).
34. Id.
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colleague to help set aside Anderson’s motion.”35  New Mexico Sena-
tor Clinton Anderson’s motion sought to advance civil rights legisla-
tion by revising Senate Rule 22 to lower the required number of votes
that could end a filibuster below a two-thirds majority.36
Despite Johnson’s attempted subjugation, “Church . . . cast his first
Senate vote in defiance of his party’s leadership —‘a thing I found
very difficult to do,’ [Church] said immediately afterward.”37
Church’s hesitation was well-founded, considering that “Lyndon John-
son, furious that Church had broken ranks, threw his pen down in
anger when he heard him vote against tabling Anderson’s motion.”38
For the next six months, Church “remained in Johnson’s ‘dog
house.’”39
Much later, in an interview with Church biographers LeRoy Ashby
and Rod Gramer in 1979, Church stated that he could not remember
“ever being pressed within the Senate on any issue as much as I was
pressured on Rule 22.”40  Such an eventful beginning to his Senate
tenure prepared him for tougher challenges and reoccurring
opponents.
Early in Church’s tenure, two key political philosophies pertinent to
his leadership on the Church Committee arose and would continue to
evolve over his career.  On May 28, 1959, Church proposed three
amendments to the Mutual Security Act aimed at preventing the
United States from “arming [Latin American] ‘military dictators
against their own people.’”41  One of the amendments sought to pub-
licly disclose previously hidden details surrounding U.S. military aid to
Latin America.42 Church described such secrecy as “an affront to the
whole philosophy of a free society.”43
His apprehension against providing covert arms to Latin America
stemmed largely from what Ashby and Gramer describe as his “be-
lie[f] that secrecy usually had more to do with concealing ‘bad judg-
ment, incompetence, and corruption’ than with protecting national
35. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 76. (citing Transcript, Frank Church Oral
History Interview with Paige E. Mulhollan 6 (May 1, 1969) (on file with Lyndon
Baines Johnson Presidential Library).
36. See Id.
37. Id. at 78 (Church quoted in 103 CONG. REC. 832 (1957)).
38. Id. (citing Transcript, Frank Church Oral History Interview with Paige E.
Mulhollan 8 (May 1, 1969) (on file with Lyndon Baines Johnson Library)).
39. Id. (citing Interview by LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer with Ward Hower
(Apr. 11, 1957)).
40. Id. at 77. (citing Interview by LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer with Frank
Church (Jan. 10, 1979)).
41. Id. at 118. (Church News Release, Frank Church Papers (June 12, 1959) (on
file at Boise State University Library System, Special Collections & Archives in Frank
Church Papers collection). See also, 105 Cong. Rec. 9,318-21 (1959)).
42. Id. at 117–18. (citing 105 CONG. REC. 9,318-21 (1959)).
43. Id. at 117. (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 9,319 (1959)).
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security.”44 Church believed that “the desire of bureaucracy to avoid
embarrassment or harassment” should not supplant “the people’s
right to know.”45
The second of these philosophies began to take hold as he repre-
sented the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a Senate study
group’s five-week-long expedition to Africa.46  During his African
journey, “he found great wisdom in Abraham Lincoln’s advice: ‘We
must disenthrall ourselves.’”47  Initially, in 1960, Church had charac-
terized the cold war as “a moral competition. . . . We will either win it
or lose it. . . . [The Soviets] have seized a third of the world in 15
years!”48  Church’s homage to President Lincoln’s philosophy of free-
ing oneself from preconceptions foreshadowed a growing divergence
from Church’s earlier views on Cold War foreign policy.
The Africa trip radically altered his foreign policy outlook, as
Ashby and Gramer observe: “Although Church sometimes placed Af-
rican independence in the context of America’s struggle with the Sovi-
ets, he was more and more skeptical about a Cold War model of
foreign policy.”49  Church would later decry that “Africa can be no
one’s prize . . . it belongs to Africa.”50  Further, Church supported
African independence movements against their former colonial oc-
cupiers, all European allies.51  Ashby and Gramer describe Church’s
radically altered stance on the Cold War, particularly his brazen pleas
with Americans “to be tolerant of the emerging African nations.
Most of these new countries, lacking private capital, would probably
choose a socialist course.”52
In outlining a proposed article for publication in the New York
Times Magazine, Church opined that “by equating anti-Communism
with freedom, we have made nearly every government bordering the
Communist world our protectorate.  We were able to hold this mas-
sive front while we possessed a nuclear weapon monopoly, but it has
44. Id. at 118. (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 9,319 (1959)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 135 (citing 107 CONG. REC. 11,759 (1961)).
47. Id. at 138.
48. Id. at 119 (citing Frank Church, Communist Challenge (Feb. 23, 1960) (tran-
script available in the Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives
in Frank Church Papers collection).
49. Id. at 139.
50. 107 Cong. Rec. 11759-62 (1961) (statement of Sen. Frank Church) (on file at
the Frank Church Collection housed in Special Collections at Boise State University);
ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 138.
51. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 139. (citing 107 CONG. REC. 11,759-62
(1961)).
52. Id. (citing Frank Church, Idaho Falls Speech (Mar. 1, 1961) (transcript availa-
ble in the Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives in Frank
Church Papers collection).
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now become a dangerous over-commitment, as Laos demonstrates.”53
Church prophetically warned against “a dangerous over-commitment
in Asia” coupled with such an unwise policy, because:
it cast the United States in the loser’s role of upholding a fragile
status quo against the rising tide of internal revolution and reform,
giving the Communists an ideal opportunity to take over the cause
of the down-trodden, while we identified ourselves with the dying
order of the Shahs and Potentates.54
Throughout the next two decades, events such as the Vietnam War
and Watergate would encourage Church to further curb government
secrecy and reject exclusively Cold War views on foreign policy.  For
many of his most formative years in the Senate, Church struggled to
bring an end to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
Upon mounting frustration over the Johnson Administration’s in-
difference to Church’s advice and a troop surge of 3,500 joining an
existing 23,000 U.S. military “advisers” in 1965, Church publicly called
for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.55  In  Church’s essay featured
prominently in the popular magazine the Saturday Evening Post,
Church pleaded for settlement in Vietnam, urging: “[T]here is so
much Washington talk about stepping up the war that it threatens to
engulf all rational discussion of the crisis we face—almost as if peace
were something to be avoided.”56  He described the ultimate strategic
challenge that the U.S. military faced in Vietnam as one they could
not overcome, stating:
American muscle, sufficiently used, may hold the 17th parallel
against infiltrators from the North, but our bayonets will not stop—
they could even spread—Communist agitation within other Asian
countries.  A government may be checked by force, but not an idea.
There is no way to fence off an ideology.57
Church also authored two companion pieces, published in late 1965
and early 1966 in the New York Times and Washington Post, implor-
ing Americans to reject a Cold War view when looking at the war in
Vietnam.  In comments strikingly similar to his previous comments on
African independence movements, Church stated: “We are an Alien
in Asia. . . . The North Vietnamese are not foreigners . . . they are
53. Letter from Frank Church to Sidney Hyman, an acclaimed author and presi-
dential speechwriter, at Enc. 7 (June 15, 1961) (on file with the Boise State University
Library, Special Collections & Archives in Frank Church Papers collection).
54. Id. at Enc. 7. See also id. at Enc. 13; ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 140.
55. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 200. See also GEORGE C. HERRING,
AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950–1975 130–31
(2d ed. 1986).
56. Sen. Frank Church, We Should Negotiate a Settlement in Vietnam, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Apr. 24, 1965, at 10.
57. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 217.
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Vietnamese.”58  Ashby and Gramer summarize one of Church’s key
points in the articles, stating that “[n]o matter what happened in Viet-
nam, other revolutions would continue to break out, and most proba-
bly not in ways that Americans preferred.  It was essential [to Church]
that these struggles not turn into American wars.”59  Church vehe-
mently rejected the notion that Vietnam served as the “final test of
our capacity to resist Communist aggression.”60
Church’s efforts to publicly persuade President Lyndon Johnson to
negotiate a settlement with North Vietnam provoked the ire of an ad-
ministration ultimately unwilling to compromise.  For instance, re-
cently declassified National Security Agency (“NSA”) documents
revealed that the NSA monitored Church’s international telephone
calls and cables.61  While there is no exact indication as to when
Church was placed on NSA’s “watch list,” the NSA’s monitoring pro-
gram began in 1967 during the Johnson Administration and continued
under President Nixon until 1973.62  Likewise, in 1965 the CIA in-
formed Church that his controversial Ramparts magazine interview—
which was tantamount to “a warning shot across the [Johnson] admin-
istration’s bow” regarding Church’s opposition to the escalating and
prolonged war in Vietnam—was being circulated by the North
Vietnamese.63  The CIA’s briefing was part of the Johnson Adminis-
tration’s effort “to impress upon Church the need to rally behind the
President.”64
The Johnson Administration’s heavy-handed attempts at intimida-
tion failed to halt criticism from the cadre of Senate “doves” critical of
the escalating war in Vietnam.  In what Church would describe as a
“show of Congressional independence,” the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee’s hearing on the Vietnam War attracted live television
58. Frank Church, How Many Dominican Republics and Vietnams Can We Take
On?, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 44–45, 177–78 (Nov. 28, 1965); Frank Church,
‘. . .the Basic Flaw in Our Asian Strategy,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1966, at E3. See also
ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2 at 217.
59. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2 at 217.
60. Id. (citing Frank Church, How Many Dominican Republics and Vietnams Can
We Take On?, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 45 (Nov. 28, 1965)).
61. Matthew M. Aid & William Burr, Secret Cold War Documents Reveal NSA
Spied on Senators . . .Along with Muhammad Ali, Martin Luther King, and a Washing-
ton Post Humorist, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2013/09/25/it_happened_here_NSA_spied_on_senators_1970s.
62. Id. See also Richard Leiby, Declassified Documents Show NSA Listened in on
MLK, Muhammad Ali and Art Buchwald, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/declassified-documents-show-nsa-listened-in-on-
mlk-muhammad-ali-and-art-buchwald/2013/09/25/1a018178-262b-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087
acd6_story.html (commenting that “[o]ddly, another senator, Howard Baker
(R–Tenn.)—an ardent supporter of the war—also was put on the NSA ‘watch list.’”).
63. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 191, 198 (citing Interview with Senator
Frank Church, RAMPARTS, Jan.–Feb. 1965, at 17).
64. Id. at 198 (quoting radio statement by John Warner to Frank Church (1965)
(transcript available in the Boise State University Library, Special Collections &
Archives in Frank Church Papers collection)).
2015] REDISCOVERING INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 445
coverage.65  Church believed that the hearings represented the future
demise of President Johnson’s war, declaring that “the jig was up.”66
Indeed, gauging from President Johnson’s reactions, he was less than
pleased with the Senate doves.  After the Senate hearings, “Johnson
irritably told several members of Congress that public criticisms of the
administration fortified the enemy’s will to resist.”67
Church believed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s hear-
ings “exhibit[ed] a new but well-founded reluctance to grant the exec-
utive any more blank checks.”68  Since World War II, the presidency’s
consolidation of war power resulted in arrogant White House foreign
policy advisors who acted, according to Church, inappropriately by
“purveying the belief that anyone who is not an expert, including Con-
gressmen, Senators, and ordinary citizens, is simply too stupid to grasp
the problems of foreign policy.”69  These events reflect an important
development in Church’s attitude towards the executive branch, most
importantly that a Senate Committee could independently frustrate
the White House and successfully forward an opposing political
agenda.
Although opposing a Democratic president could foredoom reelec-
tion in many congressional districts, Idaho was growing ever conserva-
tive in its politics. Church believed faithfully that “[i]f I had been just
another Democratic senator supporting the Johnson administration
. . . I would have never been elected.”70  While Church occasionally
took compromising positions on issues such as firearms, he was in
tune with his Idaho constituents.  For example, Fenn recalls that “if
you were a sugar beet farmer he would walk over hot coals to help
you.”71  Thus, Church’s willingness to confront powerful political op-
ponents proved instrumental in his reelections, permitting him to
65. Id. at 218. See also Frank Church statements to Ross Woodward (Feb. 4, 1966)
(on file with the Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives in
Frank Church Papers collection).
66. Id. at 219 (citing Interview by Leroy Ashby & Rod Gramer with Frank Church
(Feb. 13, 1979); Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan with Frank Church (May 1, 1969)
(transcript available in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Oral His-
tory Collection)).
67. Id. (quoting MELVIN SMALL, JOHNSON, NIXON, AND THE DOVES 81 (1988)).
68. Id. at 249 (quoting Frank Church, President and Congress in Foreign Policy:
The Threat to Constitutional Government (Oct. 29, 1966) (transcript available in the
Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives in Frank Church Pa-
pers collection)).
69. Id. at 248 (quoting Frank Church, President and Congress in Foreign Policy:
The Threat to Constitutional Government (Oct. 29, 1966) (transcript available in the
Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives in Frank Church Pa-
pers collection)).
70.  Id. at 283–83 (citing Interview by Leroy Ashby & Rod Gramer with Frank
Church (Feb. 13, 1979)).
71. Interview with Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Comm’ns Grp., in Wash.
D.C. (Aug. 27, 2013).
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serve out four terms in the Senate and become the only Idaho Demo-
crat to ever be reelected to the Senate.72
In addition to Church earning another term in the 1968 election, the
Senate doves would strengthen their resolve as they encountered a
new opponent in the form of Republican President Richard Nixon.73
Among the doves, Church led a formidable charge in attempting to
redirect America’s foreign policy and reclaim Congress’s authority
from the executive branch’s aggrandized role.74  Ashby and Gramer
point outdenote that “[d]uring the opening months of the Nixon ad-
ministration it would have been hard to find an elected official whose
judgments of American foreign policy were harsher than Church’s.”75
In speaking out against the failed Cold War mindset that had en-
snared the United States into its Vietnam imbroglio, Church proposed
the following analysis:
What [policy makers] overlooked in their preoccupation with war
games and escalation “scenarios” was the concern of millions of
Americans not just with the cost but with the character of wars they
fought and their consequent outrage against a war which—even at
what strategists would consider tolerable cost—has made a charnel
house of a small and poor Asian country.  In this moral sense there
is hope—hope that we will recognize at last that a foreign policy
which goes against our national character is untenable.76
In a poignant sentence, Church cautioned Americans that “the
greatest danger to our democracy is not that the communists will de-
stroy it, but that we will betray it by the very means chosen to defend
it.”77  In Church’s view, through its foreign aid to questionable allies,
the United States was too often perpetuating “millions of people to
live under a feudalism which fosters ignorance, hunger and disease.”78
Such statements reflect Church’s burgeoning discontent with the
status quo and an evolution in his political philosophy, now wholly
rejecting Cold War policies in favor of acknowledging the harsh reali-
72. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at xiii.
73. See David S. Broder, Nixon Wins With 290 Electoral Votes; Humphrey Joins
Him in Call for Unity: Democratic Edge in House, Senate Trimmed Slightly, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 1968, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/na-
tional/longterm/watergate/articles/110768-1.htm (stating that “Nixon, who is the first
President since Zachary Taylor in l848 to be confronted at the start of his White
House tenure with an opposition Congress.”).
74. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 291.
75. Id.
76. Frank Church, Revolution and World Order, ENGAGE, April 15, 1969, at 25
(on file with the Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives in
Frank Church Papers collection).
77. Id. at 27.
78. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 291 (citing Church, supra note 76, at
24–25).
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ties of their perceived devastating cost.79  He and the Senate doves
would soon conspire to prevent warfare’s further spread into other
Asian countries.80[ML]I’ve noticed a few paragraph breaks in the
footnotes. I’ve deleted them, but if this was done by design please feel
free to reject my changes.
Initially, concern regarding an escalating secret war in Laos, known
only to Congress, and the potential of warfare spreading into Cambo-
dia and Thailand prompted Church to propose the notable Cooper-
Church Amendment.81  Over the course of prolonged battles with the
Nixon Administration, in winding down the Vietnam War and after
President Nixon began warfare in Cambodia, later versions of the
Cooper-Church Amendment focused on ending the conflict in
Vietnam.82
As Church played a critical role in opposing the Nixon Administra-
tion’s foreign policy and wartime actions, he garnered both fame and
disappointment.  His experience as a participant in a seemingly relent-
less struggle to influence foreign policy led to the following state of
mind, as described by Ashby and Gramer:
Church’s own bouts of alienation radicalized him somewhat, push-
ing his egalitarian and democratic instincts more forcefully to the
surface.  His frustrations with the ongoing war, the “imperial presi-
dency,” and the persistent inequities of American life prodded him
to brave the political tide.83
The Nixon Administration did its best to thwart Church and his fel-
low doves, and they routinely bickered over both domestic and for-
eign policy issues.  For example, Church helped successfully block two
Supreme Court nominations over civil rights concerns.84  Likewise,
President Nixon’s use of prior restraint to prevent the New York
Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers drew ample scorn from
Church.85
When President Nixon pursued the policy known as “Vietnamiza-
tion” by reducing U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, he subsequently in-
79. Frank Church, supra note 76 at 25 (on file at the Frank Church Collection
housed in Special Collections at Boise State Univ.) (Sen. Church stating that, “[o]nly
the abstractions of diplomacy take form in high policy councils; to see its flesh and
blood one must go to a Brazilian slum, or to a devastated village in Viet Nam.”).
80. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 293 (citing Interviews by William Miller
with Sen. Frank Church (June 15 & July 27, 1994)).
81. Id. at 299–301 (citing Letters from Sen. John Sherman Cooper to Sen. Frank
Church (Sept. 30, & Oct. 9, 1969) (on file with the Boise State University Library,
Special Collections & Archives in Frank Church Papers collection).
82. Id. at 337–38. (citing Interview by William Miller with Sen. Frank Church (July
7, 1971)).
83. Id. at 343–44 (citing Interview by Jerry Levinson with Sen. Frank Church (May
11, 1987)).
84. Id. at 368 (citing Interview by Birch Bayh with Frank Church (May 14, 1987)).
85. Id. at 358.
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creased devastating bombings in North Vietnam.86  While Church was
initially unsuccessful in passing his Case-Church Amendment to bring
an end to the Vietnam War and prohibit further military action in
Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand, the breaking news of the Watergate
scandal and President Nixon’s further catastrophic bombings in Cam-
bodia propelled the Case-Church Amendment’s eventual passage in
the Senate on June 29, 1973.87  The Case-Church Amendment effec-
tively ended the Vietnam War and ceased the bombing of Cambodia
on August 15, 1973.88
Regarding the courage Church displayed in opposing Presidents
Johnson and Nixon during the Vietnam War, Fenn recalls the
following:
We had a lot of conversations about this kind of stuff, Church and I
did.  When he almost died of cancer in his early twenties, when he
first decided to run, he probably wouldn’t have done that, . . . but he
felt that life was a gift and that he faced the worst when it came to
his own mortality.  And so, he just decided “I’m going to stand for
something.”89
When Fenn was in college, he often visited the Church home and
during one conversation informed Church that “your speeches [on Vi-
etnam] are great, you and [Senator George] McGovern . . . , but really
what this is about is defunding the war.  You continue to vote for the
appropriations for this thing.”90   Church countered: “Peter, I cannot
be one of a handful of guys to vote no on money for the troops—I
cannot do that—I can speak out, I can be tough, but I cannot do that.
First of all, as you know, it would have no impact because we would
never pass it.”91
Fenn explains that the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which au-
thorized President Johnson “to take all necessary measures to repel
any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to pre-
vent further aggression” and marked a turning point for the escalation
of the Vietnam conflict, passed in the Senate by a vote of 88-2.92  The
two senators who voted in opposition, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse
and Alaska Senator Ernest Gruening, both democrats, lost their seats
in the 1968 election.93  Fenn understood that many senators, including
Church, were later disturbed by their prior support of the Gulf of Ton-
86. Id. at 379–80.
87. Id. at 404–05.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Interview with Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Comm’ns Grp., in Wash.
D.C. (Aug. 27, 2013).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.; ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 183–84.
93. E-mail from Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Communications Group, to
Marc B. Langston, (Feb. 12, 2014, 13:38 EST) (on file with author). See also ASHBY &
GRAMER, supra note 2, at 282.
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kin Resolution.94  However, Fenn recalls that “voting against appro-
priations for the Vietnam War . . . would have been political suicide in
those early years—so not only would they not have been even close to
winning the day, they felt they would have lost their seats.”95
Fenn also recalls that while his aforementioned conversation with
Church took place in in 1966, in 1970 “[Church] was out front on that
very issue when it came to Cambodia . . . and they won the argu-
ment.”96  Fenn, familiar with the family, recollects that Church’s
widow, Bethine, thought his opposition to Vietnam would kill his ca-
reer., but he took a stand and people respected that even if they didn’t
agree with him.97
While serving as Church’s chief of staff for the Washington office,
Fenn remembers Church fighting relentlessly for “the biggest non-is-
sue of our time, I call it, the Panama Canal treaties98  Fenn recalls that
Church was absolutely irritated with a colleague’s timidity.99   Church
complained to Fenn: “God, I sometimes wonder why is he here in the
first place? Why be a senator?” Fenn noted: “[Church] would be ap-
palled by a lot of [current events] today . . . you go into this [and], at
the end of the day, you lose. So what?100
Church’s penchant for leading an opposition against the executive
branch also manifested earlier in 1972 when Church co-chaired the
Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emer-
gency Powers with Republican Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland,
who later served on the Church Committee.101  The Committee’s staff
uncovered 470 special statutes conferring the President additional
powers during declared national emergencies and four declared states
of emergency that were still in effect from the Roosevelt, Truman, and
Nixon Administrations.102  Church was shocked that such laws ex-
isted, stating that “[t]hese emergency powers . . . were like a loaded
gun lying around the house, ready to be fired by any trigger-happy
president who might come along.”103
94. E-mail from Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Comm’ns Grp, to Marc B.
Langston, (Feb. 12, 2014, 13:38 EST) (on file with author). See also ASHBY &
GRAMER, supra note 2, at 300.
95. E-mail from Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Comm’ns Grp, to Marc B.
Langston, (Feb. 12, 2014, 13:38 EST) (on file with author).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Interview with Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Comm’ns Grp., in Wash.
D.C.  (Aug. 27, 2013).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 412.
102. Id. at 413 (citing Frank Church, Ending Emergency Government, 63 A.B.A. J.,
197, 198 (1977)).
103. Id. (citing Frank Church, Speech at Fresno California (Sept. 20, 1976)  (tran-
script available in the Boise State University Library, Special Collections & Archives
in Frank Church Papers collection)).
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While Church and Mathias were prepared to rein in such laws by
introducing the National Emergencies Act in July 1974, the pair would
agree with Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s sentiment that
“it is too good and important a bill to let those Nixon people get at
it.”104  The resignation of President Nixon paved the way for the Na-
tional Emergencies Act to become law when President Ford signed it
in September 1976.105  Church considered the National Emergencies
Act’s passage to have “more to do with returning our government to
normalcy—after 43 years of emergency rule—than anything that has
occurred during my twenty years of service in the Senate.”106
Another event in 1972 would also pit Church against the executive
branch, when the press raised various allegations about a multina-
tional corporation, the International Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (“ITT”), including the allegation that ITT bribed the Nixon
Administration in order to prevent a Marxist government from arising
in Chile.107  As a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Church proposed the creation of a Subcommittee on Mul-
tinational Corporations (“Multinationals Committee”), which he
chaired from 1973–1976.108
Church’s memory of eastern companies exploiting Idaho’s re-
sources and its legislature instilled in him a healthy distrust of large
corporations.109  One of Church’s political principles that developed
during his chairmanship was the notion that “[w]e must never accede
to the rationale, in foreign policy or in business, that we must become
as corrupt as those we come up against.”110
Evidence of secret corruption between Latin American regimes and
the United States undoubtedly frustrated Church, whose concern over
such improprieties first surfaced in the Senate in 1959 when he
amended the Mutual Security Act to expose the United States’s secret
military aid to Latin American dictatorships.111  Likewise, as the
Watergate scandal unfolded, Church perceived it as a perilous combi-
nation “of a foreign policy broken loose from its domestic, democratic
moorings” and “an aura of imperial infallibility.”112  Church under-
stood secrecy’s inherent dangers to a democracy, as he posed the
question: “If ‘dirty tricks’ were acceptable in foreign policy, why, in
104. Id. at 414 (citing Memorandum from William Miller to Senator Mathias (Oct.
3, 1974).
105. Id. at 415.
106. Id. at 416.
107. Id.
108. R. Gwenn Stearn, Frank Church Chronology, BOISE STATE UNIV., http://li-
braries.boisestate.edu/special/church/Church1.shtm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
109. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 422.
110. F. FORRESTER CHURCH, FATHER AND SON: A PERSONAL BIOGRAPHY OF SEN-
ATOR FRANK CHURCH OF IDAHO BY HIS SON 101 (1987).
111. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 117–18.
112. Id. at 415.
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the view of the White House Chiefs-of-Staff, were they any less so in
domestic affairs?”113
Upon the Multinationals Committee uncovering astonishing revela-
tions of widespread corruption and bribery by multinational corpora-
tions to foreign officials, the Nixon Administration, and the CIA,
Church noted the following:
All of this wrongdoing is acknowledged by straight-faced executives
who say they had to break the law in order to get the business.  The
excuse, after all, is written plainly in the adage, “When in
Rome. . . .” But the excuse is hollow.  The bad habits of Rome were
brought home to America.  The roster of companies that made ille-
gal corporate contributions to the Nixon campaign in 1972 includes
many of the companies which have turned to bribery abroad.  If we
condone bribery of foreign officials we will sow the seeds of corrup-
tion in our own land.114
Church openly criticized the role of American corporations utilizing
the CIA to dictate foreign elections while U.S. troops were suffering
heavy casualties to guarantee the rights of free elections at home.115
Senator Joseph Biden described one of Church’s key political doc-
trines as “power out of the hands of the people is a dangerous, dan-
gerous thing.”116  Church’s chairmanship of the Multinationals
Committee solidified his aforementioned doctrine and concomitantly
prepared him for the challenges he would face when investigating the
intelligence community as chair of the Church Committee.
When the Multinationals Committee convened closed-door hear-
ings with former CIA Director Richard Helms and other current and
former intelligence officials, Church permitted his chief counsel, Je-
rome Levinson, to lead a difficult interrogation for Helms, resulting in
Helms willfully omitting critical details of the CIA’s activities in
Chile.117  In Levinson’s words, Helms acted like “a cornered rabbit”
during his interrogation.118  In order to gain a more complete under-
standing of the situation, the Multinationals Committee became the
first congressional committee to have active CIA agents testify before
it.119  The entire experience left Church bewildered, as evidenced by
his reflection that “[t]he imagination is set free to assume the United
States is involved in every shady deal on God’s earth.”120
Upon later discovering from succeeding CIA Director William
Colby that the CIA explicitly supported Chile’s military coup in assas-
sinating its socialist president, such facts brought into question former
113. Id. at 405.
114. CHURCH, supra note 110, at 101.
115. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 430–31.
116. Id. at 421.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 428–29.
119. Id. at 429.
120. Id. at 433.
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Director Helms’s prior conflicting testimony.121  Church displayed fe-
rocity towards the notion that he and his fellow senators had been so
flagrantly misled.122  He was the only member of the Multinationals
Committee to publicly exhibit such lividness over the prospect of be-
ing lied to by Helms.123
Church was also perturbed by the lack of congressional oversight of
the CIA, bemoaning, “the watchdog committee never really watched
the dog.”124  Democrat Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota, later a
Church Committee member, also expressed his frustrations over a
lack of congressional oversight of the CIA and even proposed that the
Senate form a committee like the Special Committee on National
Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers.125
The 1974 reports of CIA misdeeds by Seymour Hersh in the New
York Times brought the Church Committee into being by a vote of 82-
4.126  Church would simultaneously chair the Church Committee and
the Multinationals Committee, which continued its investigations into
a variety of important topics such as arms trade and alarming interna-
tional briberies.127  While Church and his Multinationals Committee
staff demonstrated ingenuity in gathering documents from uncoopera-
tive corporations, the Ford Administration would prove a more
nuanced challenge because of its ability to claim executive privilege.128
III. UNCOVERING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S SECRETS
At the onset of their investigation, the Church Committee pursued
two primary goals: gaining access to evidence by acquiring documents
and interrogating witnesses and determining the impropriety or ille-
gality of the evidence obtained.129  The Church Committee’s ability to
publicly disclose highly controversial government secrets may be more
attributed to its bipartisan composition and cautious approach rather
than partisan zeal or a desire to undermine the executive branch.
Throughout the Church Committee’s existence, Church pursued a
strategy of relentlessly negotiating with the executive branch and zeal-
ously championing Congress’s right to obtain information exclusively
121. Id. at 469.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 470.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 471.
127. Id. at 457, 490.
128. See id. at 440 (recalling how Church and his Committee staff aggressively pur-
sued the oil company SoCal for documents pertinent to their investigation despite
SoCal’s attempts at delay).
129. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 28.
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in the possession of the executive branch.130  The Church Committee’s
bargaining power increased over time because Church upheld his
commitment to prevent Committee staff from leaking classified infor-
mation.131  Likewise, according to one of the former Church Commit-
tee staff members, Frederick Baron, Church’s looming bid for the
presidency, which he embarked upon as the Church Committee com-
pleted its final reports and recommendations, greatly aided the Com-
mittee’s success because it “roused Church to stand up and oppose the
intelligence community, head on, in public.  The two interests coin-
cided.”132  Unfortunately for Church, the two interests did not bolster
each other equally, as Church Committee Staff Director Bill Miller
remarked: “He devoted his entire energy to the problem of dealing
with the intelligence agencies.  As a result, he gave up the
presidency.”133
Although presidential ambitions factored into the dynamics of the
Church Committee, Church often gained consensus from his Republi-
can colleagues in carrying out the Committee’s work.134  His tactic of
building a consensus, which would have been easier to achieve by re-
lying on party or ideological factions, resulted in unanimity during
times of intense partisan pressure from the Ford Administration.135
Due to its temporary existence, the Church Committee lacked the
requisite time to battle over its subpoena power in the courts and
would have likely been stymied by a majority of the Senate on many
of the persons it sought to subpoena.136
Even with a desire to build a consensus, Church would have assur-
edly faltered without the support of his Republican colleagues, partic-
ularly Vice Chairman Tower, who represented the Committee
alongside Church in most of the critical negotiations with the execu-
tive branch.  Church, reflecting on Tower’s role on the Church Com-
mittee, stated: “Considering the antipathy towards the investigation,
he worked.  He was not obstructive.  He didn’t make my life misera-
ble.  In fact, he was very supportive.  I respected him highly.”137
Despite Church’s praise for Vice Chairman Tower, Ashby and
Gramer describe the inherent partisan tension of the Church Commit-
tee by retelling the following exchange: “Goldwater’s staff designee
candidly told the [Church] committee’s chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz,
130. Id. at 269; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Access to Government Information is a
Foundation of American Democracy—But the Courts Don’t Get It, 65 OKLA. L. REV.
645, 645–46 (2013).
131. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 29.
132. Id. at 269.
133. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMU-
NITY 39 (2d ed. 1994).
134. Id. at 36.
135. Id.
136. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 270.
137. SMIST, supra note 133, at 36.
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‘Fritz, I’m not here to work for you.  I’m here to spy on you.’”138
Goldwater, during the trying summer months of the investigation,
even claimed that Soviet agents had infiltrated Congress.139  However,
the FBI’s subsequent report to the Church Committee wholly rejected
Goldwater’s claim.140  Likewise, Tower recalled that Senate Minority
Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania had requested that Tower serve as
the GOP’s “damage control officer.”141
Even with such inherent partisan and ideological divisions, each Re-
publican member proved instrumental in balancing the Committee’s
bipartisan legacy.  For instance, Church Committee Chief Counsel
Schwarz explained the criticality of Church’s consensus strategy in en-
suring bipartisan cooperation for the Committee’s enduring legacy,
stating the following:
This could have easily been made into a Nixon’s bad-guy type of
committee.  But there would have been a heavy price for doing this,
a political price.  The committee would not have retained Republi-
can cooperation and support.  And it would have resulted in no
credible recommendations for reform.  The importance of the full
factual record would have been lost.  These problems have been
deep and sustained since FDR.  It is not just one bad person.142
Often more partisan and assertive than the Church Committee in
gathering documents, the House Select Committee on Intelligence
(“Pike Committee”), led by New York Representative Otis Pike and a
solid Democrat majority, showed little deference to the executive
branch.143  Boldly, Pike publicly decried that “[t]he bottom line is that
the Congress has the right to receive classified information without
any strings attached to it.”144  Loch Johnson described the more cau-
tious route taken in the Senate, stating that “[t]he Church committee
followed traditional procedures in attempting to obtain classified doc-
uments: negotiating with executive officials over what papers could be
received and how they would be handled.”145  Likewise, Loch Johnson
offered his inside perspective in comparing the two approaches, stat-
ing that “[i]n Senator Church’s view, his committee had avoided some
of the confrontation experienced by the Pike committee in the strug-
gle for documents because ‘we got an early start and we had time to
enter into negotiations with the White House.’”146
138. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 474.
139. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 69.
140. Id.
141. ASHBY & GRAMER, supra note 2, at 473.
142. SMIST, supra note 133, at 41.
143. See KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE
POST-WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI 142–44 (1996).
144. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 79.
145. Id. at 78–79.
146. Id. at 98.
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In addition to the contributions of the Church Committee’s chair-
man and its members, the Senate invested heavily in the success of the
Church Committee.  In allocating funds for at least 135 staff members
and allowing them to work out of the Dirksen Senate Office Build-
ing’s auditorium, the Senate provided the Committee with the neces-
sary personnel to thoroughly investigate the intelligence
community.147  Even with such a generous allocation of resources, the
Church Committee would have dismally failed without gaining access
to evidence or by not hiring qualified staff for such an unprecedented
investigation.
Church was permitted to hire Miller and Schwarz.  These choices
proved instrumental in the Church Committee’s success, as each exer-
cised sagacity throughout the trying months ahead.148  Former Church
Committee counsel, Joseph Dennin, commented that the caliber of
staff hired engendered “a sense of sitting with the ‘best and the
brightest.’”149
As a threshold issue, the Church Committee conferred security
clearances upon its own staff after reviewing background tests con-
ducted by the FBI.150  They were spared polygraphs because the wis-
dom of the Committee’s parent chamber regarded polygraphs as
“twentieth-century witchcraft.”151  Likewise, the Dirksen auditorium
was chosen as staff offices because of its single entry-exit point, which
was guarded around the clock to prevent tampering with sensitive and
classified materials contained therein.152
During its investigation, the Church Committee encountered many
problems, but its inability to hasten the executive branch’s coopera-
tion or at times even gain access to information critical to its inquiry
proved a reoccurring obstacle.153  In initially having roughly eight
months to conduct their investigation of the intelligence agencies,
Church and his Committee staff would prove instrumental in success-
fully negotiating with the executive branch.154
Initially, the CIA and FBI were surprisingly cooperative.  For in-
stance, CIA Director William Colby waived CIA employees’ secrecy
oaths when interacting with the Church Committee and provided or-
ganizational charts, budgets, and documents pertaining to the CIA’s
legal authority for its clandestine activities.155  In turn, Church Com-
mittee staff signed secrecy agreements prohibiting the release of clas-
147. Id. at 35.
148. See id. at 36–37.
149. SMIST, supra note 133, at 47.
150. Id. at 49.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 28.
154. See id. at 27.
155. Id. at 28–29 (citing Memorandum for the Record, William G. Miller (Feb. 28,
1975)).
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sified materials ascertained in the course of their investigation.156
Soon after, the FBI agreed to a similar arrangement.157  Notably, the
senators were not required to sign secrecy agreements.158
The Church Committee’s first encounter with the White House
would prove less than fully cooperative.  On March 5, 1975, Church
and Tower and a few Committee staff members, including Staff Direc-
tor Miller and Chief Counsel Schwarz, met with President Ford, Sec-
retary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, White House speechwriter
Patrick Buchanan, and additional staff in the Oval Office.159  Church
requested a catalog of documents, most of which had never previously
been obtained by any congressional committee.160
Church also requested that the President issue a written directive to
all of the intelligence agencies requiring them to cooperate with the
investigation.161  President Ford declined to issue any written direc-
tives due largely to the prospect of having to issue a similar directive
for the seemingly more aggressive Pike Committee in the House.162
Instead, President Ford suggested that he would determine the propri-
ety of issuing any such directives on a “case-by-case basis.”163
Responding to Church’s request for access to agency files, Kissinger
hissed: “Asking for information is one thing, but going through the
files is another.  The covert action files are very sensitive.”164  Presi-
dent Ford defended Church, retorting that “Senator Church is not
asking for the right to go fishing in the files. . . .  I am certain all his
requests would be relevant to the inquiry.”165  The President further
promised Church and Tower that the White House would be “as coop-
erative as possible.”166
By April 1, 1975, Church Committee staff met with White House
designees at the Old Executive Office Building to voice their com-
plaints regarding the lack of documents obtained despite their various
requests.167  While the White House staff pleaded for patience due to
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the sheer volume of documents requested, two days later the Church
Committee received a heap of  documents.168  As Church Committee
staff continued to press for documents throughout April and May,
particularly those related to CIA assassination plots, their persistence
was fruitfully rewarded—except for their inability to gain budgetary
information on intelligence agencies.169
While the Church Committee obtained more than they believed ini-
tially possible, Church believed that much of the delay regarding out-
standing requests was an attempt by the Rockefeller Commission to
prevent being overshadowed by the Church Committee.170  Church
expressed his concern over the torpidity of the Committee’s pace and
stated to his fellow Senators that “[t]he executive branch is setting the
pace.  We cannot make ourselves subject to their control.”171
However, the Church Committee soon discovered a less obliging
CIA when the agency limited the number of persons able to research
its histories and required Committee staff to only view such docu-
ments at CIA facilities, where they were allowed only to take brief
summary notes.172  Similarly, when Church and Tower attempted an
end-run around President Ford by asking Vice President Rockefeller
for the files possessed by the Rockefeller Commission, he politely
declined.173
As the Church Committee entered its next phase of inquiry, ob-
taining sworn testimony from current and former intelligence person-
nel, the CIA insisted that representatives from its legal offices monitor
such testimony and be able to provide advice to those being inter-
viewed.174  However, the Church Committee unanimously rejected
the CIA’s terms, and Church later explained to the press that “there
should be no inhibition, or possible inhibition, as the committee pro-
ceeds with these interrogations, and the executive departments will be
so advised.”175
Another critical obstacle to the Church Committee’s success, setting
an agenda, related directly to its ability to gather factual evidence.
Without adequate time to study the evidence, the Committee staff
could not prepare the senators or determine who should appear
168. Id. at 35–36 (citing Memorandum from William G. Miller to Frank Church
(Apr. 3, 1975)).
169. Id. at 39 (citing Memorandum for the Record, William G. Miller (Apr. 1,
1975)).
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171. Id. (quoting Press Briefing, Frank Church, Church Comm., (Apr. 16, 1975)).
172. Id. at 41 (citing Memorandum of Conversation, William G. Miller (May 6,
1975)).
173. Id. at 42 (citing Interview with Fritz Schwarz, Chief Counsel, Church Comm.
(June 8, 1979)).
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before them.176  Despite these challenges, the Church Committee’s ac-
quisition of some of the requested documents paved the way for inves-
tigating covert activities of the CIA, particularly assassinations.177
On May 15, 1975, the CIA’s Colby testified in a closed session
before the Church Committee.178  His overview of covert action, “the
policy of interfering secretly in the affairs of other countries,” pro-
vided a candid starting point from which the senators would refocus
their inquiries over the next several meetings with Director Colby.179
However, in delivering requested documents to the Committee, he
omitted any documents detailing specific assassination plots.180  After
the hearing, Church decried to the press that “there are indications of
gaps in the record.”181
On May 21, 1975, Colby returned for two days of closed session
hearings to answer questions regarding assassinations.182  Upon
Colby’s confirmation that the CIA was involved in assassination plots,
Church, outraged, proclaimed to the press afterwards: “It is simply
intolerable that any agency of the government of the United States
may engage in murder.”183
While the assassination hearings confirmed the worst of the Com-
mittee’s suspicions, they still needed more documents from the FBI
and IRS before being able to move forward on domestic surveillance
hearings.184  However, the summer continued to yield fewer docu-
ments, as the White House continued to reiterate that the Church
Committee “[b]e patient; we’re understaffed for this job.”185 Colby,
subsequently reflecting upon the White House’s excuses, utterly re-
jected their claim, stating that “[i]t wasn’t really a matter of under-
standing . . . they just didn’t want to turn over documents.”186
Further, Colby explained that “[w]hile the heat from the Church com-
mittee was on the CIA, the White House told us not to cooperate . . .
but when the heat began to move toward the White House, they be-
gan to give up papers.”187  Thereafter, the White House eventually
176. Id. at 42 (citing Interview with Fritz Schwarz, Chief Counsel, Church Comm.
(June 8, 1979)).
177. Id.
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directed the Rockefeller Commission to provide the Church Commit-
tee with its assassination documents, without redactions.188
Loch Johnson described the Church Committee staff’s persistence
in investigating the assassination plots, stating that “the committee
marshaled more than a hundred witnesses, almost ten thousand pages
of sworn testimony, and the close examination of thousands of secret
documents relevant to the assignation plots.”189  Determining illegal-
ity was not too difficult, as the CIA plotted to kill Fidel Castro of
Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the former Congo, and aided in the
assassinations of Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo
Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and General René Schneider of
Chile.190  But some cases lacked enough evidence to clearly indicate
the extent of CIA involvement, such as President Sukarno of Indone-
sia and François “Papa Doc” Duvalier of Haiti.191  Such documents
also revealed a confusing and lax command and control structure
within the CIA, rendering the Committee’s staff perplexed as they at-
tempted to triangulate blame upon whose authority such assassination
plots were executed.192
As the Church Committee pursued the acquisition of additional
documents from various agencies, the Committee’s members grew in-
creasingly frustrated.  The ailing Philip Hart, in expressing his irrita-
tion with the CIA, stated to his colleagues: “What are we here for!
We’re here to investigate an agency.  Here it is, the end of July, and
we still are bartering with the agency over seeing files!”193  His Re-
publican colleague, Senator Howard Baker, echoed Philip Hart’s frus-
trations, declaring: “Let’s issue subpoenas immediately to anyone who
does not cooperate with this committee. . . .”194
On August 12, 1975, the Church Committee voted to subpoena the
White House to acquire portions of President Nixon’s papers.195  Soon
after, on August 12th, Church appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press,
explaining his strategy in sparingly exercising the Committee’s sub-
poena power:
As the confidence in the committee has built because of the lack of
any leaks . . . and the great care we’ve taken with sensitive informa-
tion, we have been able to obtain more data from the executive than
has ever been the case in any congressional investigation in the
past. . . . But from the beginning I faced a decision: whether to try
188. Id. at 48.
189. Id. at 59.
190. Id. at 48 (citing SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERA-
TIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS 1, 6 (1975)).
191. Id. at 49.
192. Id. at 57 (citing an interview with F.A.O. Schwarz, Jr., June 8, 1979).
193. Id. at 68.
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195. Id. at 70.
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and negotiate for this information as confidence in the committee
built, or whether immediately to stand upon the constitutional pre-
rogative of the committee, invite a confrontation, and go into the
courts. . . .  I think we’ve taken the right course.196
During Church’s same appearance on NBC’s Meet the Press, he
warned of the dangerous course ahead if the United States continued
to pursue authoritarian tactics on its own citizenry:
If this government ever became a tyranny there would be no place
to hide . . . and no way to fight back, because the most careful effort
to combine together in resistance to the government—no matter
how privately it was done—is within the reach of the govern-
ment. . . .  We must see to it that all agencies which possess this
technology operate within the law and under proper supervision so
that we never cross over that abyss. That’s the abyss from which
there is no return.197
The White House likely viewed Church’s warnings against tyranni-
cal governments as a critique against current practices used by the
Ford Administration and a preview of the type of rhetoric that would
likely emerge from the Church Committee’s imminent public hear-
ings.  President Ford shot back in a televised speech on August 19,
1975, rejected Church’s conclusions, and offered a counter-warning
that “any reckless congressional action to cripple the effectiveness of
our intelligence services in legitimate operations would be
catastrophic.”198
Fortunately for the Church Committee, despite White House at-
tempts to delay the Committee’s work, shortly before its first public
hearing on September 16, 1975, Colby informed the Committee that
the agency had discovered a stockpile of lethal toxins that President
Nixon had ordered destroyed.199  The Church Committee was further
briefed by the CIA on the details surrounding their hidden arsenal of
poisons, and Committee staff prepared for the hearings by negotiating
with the CIA for immediate declassification of information, interro-
gating witnesses, and preparing the Committee members for a public
hearing.200
The public hearings on poisons unveiled blockbuster misdeeds by
the CIA, addressed infra in this Article, and also highlighted, accord-
ing to Church, just “how elusive the chain of command can be in the
intelligence community.”201  Church considered the loose command
structure to necessitate “improved mechanisms of accountability all
196. Id. at 70–71.
197. Id. at 71–72.
198. Id. at 72 (quoting Gerald R. Ford, Address in Minneapolis Before the Annual
Convention of the American Legion (Aug. 19, 1975)).
199. Id. at 72–74; SMIST, supra note 133, at 71 (stating “On February 14, 1970,
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the way from the White House to the outer branches of the intelli-
gence establishment.”202
However, upon concluding the first set of public hearings, the
Church Committee continued its struggle to develop an agenda with
some of the members feeling as though the Committee was rushing
into public hearings without adequate closed-door hearings with intel-
ligence officials and former Nixon Administration personnel, includ-
ing President Nixon.203 Gary Hart commented that the decision to
proceed with hearings on the Nixon Administration first and then on
the NSA, with hope that the committee could hold closed NSA brief-
ings between the two hearings, was akin to “building your boat as you
go out to sea.”204
The Church Committee’s primary focus on the Nixon Administra-
tion centered around a White House associate counsel’s plan to esca-
late intelligence gathering methods for anti-Vietnam War
demonstrators and other dissidents.205  White House aide Thomas
Charles Huston’s plan (“Huston Plan”) was developed in response to
President Nixon’s chastisement for his intelligence directors failure to
curtail what he described to them as “[c]ertainly hundreds, perhaps
thousands of Americans—mostly under 30—are determined to de-
stroy our society.”206  In conjunction with recommendations by the
CIA, FBI, and NSA, the Huston plan would have authorized intelli-
gence agencies to “monitor international cables, telegrams, and mail
of Americans citizens; intensify the electronic surveillance of domestic
dissenters and selected establishments; break into specified establish-
ments and into homes of domestic dissenters; and intensify the surveil-
lance of American college students.”207
While President Nixon approved most of the Huston Plan, FBI Di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover allegedly “went through the ceiling” upon re-
ceiving word of the President’s approval and convinced Attorney
General John N. Mitchell to immediately reverse course, effectively
scuttling the Huston Plan.208  This incident revealed Hoover’s extor-
tionate clout and the inherent danger poised by an administration re-
solved to use the intelligence agencies as a means to accomplish its
misdeeds.209
While the Church Committee’s closed investigation into the Huston
Plan yielded few forthcoming witnesses, a division among various in-
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telligence agencies became quite apparent.210  Former CIA Director
Helms displayed dismay towards Hoover and “relished explaining his
shortcomings in the intelligence field.”211  Likewise, Huston, during
the public hearing, offered that “[i]f J. Edgar Hoover had known
about CIA domestic spying on student protestors (Operation
CHAOS) . . . he ‘would have had an absolute stroke.’”212
Huston, in an earlier closed interrogation, reinforced the concept of
a loose command structure, stating that if the White House “had
known these tools were being used [by both the FBI and the CIA] and
still not getting any results, it might have changed the whole ap-
proach.”213  Church characterized the various intelligence agencies as
“independent fiefdoms,” stating further that “[t]he president and Mr.
Huston, it appears, were deceived by intelligence officials.”214  In
cross-examining former CIA counterintelligence head James An-
gleton, Church admonished the entire intelligence community, stating
the following:
So the commander-in-chief is not the commander-in-chief at all.  He
is just a problem.  You do not want to inform him in the first place,
because he might say no.  That is the truth of it.  When he did say
no, you disregarded it.  And then you call him the commander-in-
chief.215
Although President Nixon may have been unaware of the extent of
the actions independently undertaken by the intelligence agencies, it
cannot absolve his extreme view of young dissidents giving rise to the
Huston Plan’s creation, characterized by Mondale as an “enormous,
unrestricted paranoid fear about the American people.”216  The
Church Committee had abandoned its plan interviewing President
Nixon, but instead mailed him a list of questions on a variety of topics,
including the Huston Plan.217
The Huston Plan hearings were emblematic of the dilemma facing
the Church Committee: In the beginning, the Committee was de-
lighted to gain access to a plethora of classified material, but as the
Committee progressed presidents and their advisors became the
prime suspects in a variety of nefarious activities. Schwarz described
the evolution of the Church Committee’s conclusions, stating the
following:
210.  JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 83.
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Specific agency acts, examined in isolation, sometimes suggested
that an agency acted on its own, even misleading political superiors.
But the full record of many years and many agencies made clear
that ultimate responsibility was properly fixed with presidents, at-
torneys general, and other high executive branch officials.”218
Thus, both the Church and Pike Committees eagerly attempted to
access the highest-level executive branch officials and former officials,
seeking to glean further details regarding their knowledge of and par-
ticipation in such alarming activities.  However, gaining access to them
would prove most difficult.
On October 28, 1975, the Church Committee was delighted when
Colby openly detailed the CIA’s actions against the Allende regime in
Chile.219  This raised the criticality of whether Secretary of State Kis-
singer would testify before the Committee, due to his suspected in-
volvement in the plot.220
Soon after, Secretary of State Kissinger refused to publicly discuss
covert actions before the Pike Committee.221   While the Church
Committee also sought Kissinger’s public testimony on covert actions,
Church did not believe the Committee had the requisite Senate votes
to compel his testimony.222  Even the more partisan Pike Committee
had rejected Pike’s motion to censure Kissinger for his refusal to ap-
pear before his committee.  Pike joked after his motion’s defeat that
“[i]t was my opinion that we should proceed against Dr. Kissinger as
we would any other ordinary mortal.”223
Although Kissinger ended up testifying before the Church Commit-
tee on November 21, 1975, only in regards to U.S. covert operations in
Angola, both he and former Colby refused to publicly address covert
actions in Chile.224  The Church Committee proceeded to hold public
hearings on Chile without these key witnesses, as discussed infra.225
Earlier, on November 3, 1975, the Ford Administration, evidently
unhappy with Colby’s forthrightness, fired him.226  Seymour Bolten,
then the CIA’s chief review staff for the Senate and the House, sum-
marized the White House’s perspective on Colby, stating the
following:
The White House was very critical of Colby whenever something
came up when Colby decided to compromise.  But whenever the
ball was tossed to the White House, they would cave in sooner.
218. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 21, at 44.
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220. Id. at 103.
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They were terrified of subpoenas.  They did not want to force a res-
olution of constitutional questions that had remained in the twilight
zone since the beginnings of the Republic.227
Colby recalled that he “made an early decision that it was in the inter-
ests of the agency that the true story get out about what the misdeeds
were—which were few and far between.”228  He believed that his
forthcoming approach “brought [the] CIA within our constitutional
system.  Up to that time, we hadn’t.”229  Bolten further defended
Colby’s actions by disparaging the White House’s criticism that he had
caved before the Church and Pike Committees, stating that “[the
White House] didn’t give him the support necessary to stand up to the
committees.  The CIA was pretty much on its own.”230  Church’s scorn
over Colby’s departure was evident in his statement to the press:
“There is no question in my mind but that concealment is the new
order of the day. . . .  Hiding evil is the trademark of a totalitarian
government.”231  Church also abhorred the prospect of Colby’s re-
placement, prominent Republican George H.W. Bush, fearing that
Bush would politicize the CIA.232
The final surprise from the executive branch came on March 10,
1976.  During the final markup of the Church Committee’s reports
and recommendations, the Ford Administration aided former Presi-
dent Nixon in leaking his responses to the Church Committee’s ques-
tionnaire to the press in an effort to undermine the newsworthiness of
the Church Committee’s findings.233  President Nixon attempted to
justify his 1969 warrantless wiretapping of several journalists and gov-
ernment employees based on presidential sovereignty and “because of
a Presidential determination that it was in the interests of national
security.”234
Church warned in the Washington Post that President Nixon’s ad-
vancement of “‘the sovereign presidency’ . . . was a ‘pernicious and
dangerous doctrine.’”235  Church believed that “once government of-
ficials start believing that they have the power and the right to act
secretly outside the law, we have started down a long, slippery slope
which culminates in a Watergate.”236  Church’s sentiments on Presi-
dent Nixon’s statement reflect a continuation of one of his bedrock
227. SMIST, supra note 133, at 61 (quoting Interview with Seymour Bolton (June 3,
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political doctrines, as summarized by Biden: “[P]ower out of the
hands of the people is a dangerous, dangerous thing.”237
While this Section of the Article focused on the Church Commit-
tee’s struggle to gain access to evidence and determine whether such
evidence demonstrated instances of impropriety or illegality, much of
the Committee’s work would have been severely minimized had many
of its hearings and findings not been made public.  The next Section
will detail the Herculean effort mustered by Church and some of his
colleagues in advocating for the public release of some of the govern-
ment’s most embarrassing secrets.
IV. PUBLIC RELEASE OF CONTROVERSIAL STATE SECRETS
The Church Committee faced several challenges to public disclo-
sure of many of the upsetting secrets it discovered.  First, Church
Committee members favoring disclosure needed assent from their fel-
low committee members, either by reaching a consensus or by achiev-
ing the votes requisite to set the agenda of any public meeting or
release its findings.  Second, the Senate rules provided a quandary as
to whether the Church Committee could disclose classified informa-
tion without majority approval from the Senate.  Third, Church Com-
mittee members struggled to navigate through negative public
perceptions of their investigation that threatened their ability to hold
public hearings and publish the Committee’s final reports.  Amidst all
of the difficulties presented, Church’s leadership proved critical in
resolving these matters in favor of public disclosure.
From the first meeting of the Church Committee’s members on
April 9, 1975, its Republican senators expressed their preference to
exercise extreme caution in conducting the investigation.238 Goldwa-
ter urged the Committee to “slow down” believing that the Commit-
tee was endangering “what little intelligence this country gets, and
believe me, it is little compared to what our enemies have.”239  His
apprehensions partly stemmed from the leaks encountered from the
Watergate Committee’s, which Goldwater believed had “leaked like
an old sieve.”240  Goldwater did “not want that to happen in an area
as sensitive as intelligence.”241
Goldwater’s apprehensions concerning the possibility of the Church
Committee leaking valuable information reached its apex when the
Committee deliberated over whether it would hold a public hearing
on the NSA.  On October 2nd, Secretary of Defense James Schles-
inger and NSA Director General Lew Allen Jr. met with the Church
Committee to caution against any public hearings on the NSA be-
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cause they believed such hearings would likely result in the release of
information on the NSA’s technological capabilities, which enemies
could use to thwart NSA surveillance.242  Church convinced his col-
leagues to hold public hearings despite such warnings because of the
Committee’s commendable track record of preventing disclosures
deemed too sensitive for public consumption.243
However, the Committee’s reputation was tarnished that weekend
when Mondale inadvertently leaked details regarding assassinations
not yet made public while speaking at Denison College in Granville,
Ohio.244  To make matters worse, Church, appearing on ABC’s Issues
and Answers, responded to Mondale’s speech by offering even further
details on assassinations.245
On October 5th, Attorney General Edward Levi also sought an au-
dience with the Church Committee in order to dissuade the Commit-
tee from pursuing public hearings on the NSA, alluding specifically to
disclosures on the NSA’s SHAMROCK program.246  He argued that
such hearings would reveal the close relationships between private
companies and the government that were  permitting the government
to access international communications.247  He cautioned that such
disclosures would ruin the companies’ reputations and likely result in
private companies refusing to cooperate with the government in the
future.248
Upon Levi’s departure, Goldwater urged the Committee to recon-
sider public hearings on the subject, observing that the Committee
was “flirting with real trouble.”249  The majority of the Committee,
including Democrats Morgan and Gary Hart, voted to delay any pub-
lic hearings on the NSA, due at least in part to Church and Mondale’s
recent unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information.250
Initially Church enjoyed the stalwart support of his colleagues in
negotiating with the executive branch over their release of documents,
but by then it seemed to many staffers as though he had lost control of
his Committee.251   Likewise, the Committee’s dilemma concerning
the release of its Interim Assassination Report raised a central prob-
lem that would haunt the Committee throughout its existence.
During the Church Committee’s earlier meeting on July 23, 1975,
Goldwater questioned the Committee’s ability to release such a report
242. Id. at 92.
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without the consent of the full Senate.252  With the concurrence of
Tower, Baker then crystallized the Republican senators’ position with
the following argument: “We have no right to put ourselves above the
Senate.”253  Nevertheless, Mondale promoted the publication of the
Interim Assassination Report to rid the Committee of the “tarbaby”
consisting of intermittent “bits and pieces” already being mentioned
in the press.254
On October 9th, President Ford requested that the Church Com-
mittee halt its publication of the Interim Assassination Report, citing
its prospective use by the Soviet Union as propaganda.255  The issue
lingered without resolution until November 3rd when the Ford Ad-
ministration again urged Committee members to keep the Interim As-
sassination Report secret, now claiming that disclosure would
jeopardize national security.256  In Church’s response, he told the
press that despite the President’s request, “[the American people]
have a right to know what their government has done.”257
As Church entered the committee room, he participated in a pro-
longed discussion over the various Senate and committee rules gov-
erning the release of classified information.258  Infuriated, both at his
colleagues’ discussion and President Ford’s attempt to sway the Com-
mittee against the report’s disclosure, Church threw down a document
and uttered: “I will have to reconsider my chairmanship of this com-
mittee.”259  Former Church Committee staffer Loch Johnson under-
stood Church’s statement to indicate that “if the committee bowed to
the president and kept the assassination findings secret, the chairman
would resign.”260  Likewise, he also recalled: “A silence fell over the
room.  No one had seen Church so utterly dejected.”261
President Ford’s plea for nondisclosure likely elicited Church’s de-
spondent tenor because it frustrated Church’s aspiration to wield pub-
lic disclosures as a means of attaining drastic reforms for the
intelligence agencies and congressional intelligence oversight.  Follow-
ing the President’s request would perpetuate what critics knocked as
the executive’s duplicitous control of classified information, aptly de-
scribed in 1974 by Representative William Moorhead, then Chair of
the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee
of the House Government Operations Committee:
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Critics of the present system of handling classified information
within the Executive Branch point to an obvious double standard. On
one hand, the full power of the Government’s legal system is exer-
cised against certain newspapers for publishing portions of the Penta-
gon Papers and against someone like Daniel Ellsberg for his alleged
role in their being made public. This is contrasted with other actions
by top Executive officials who utilize the technique of “instant declas-
sification” of information they want leaked. Sometimes it is an “off-
the-record” press briefing or “backgrounders” that becomes “on-the-
record” at the conclusion of the briefing or at some future politically
strategic time. Such Executive Branch leaks may be planted with
friendly news columnists. Or, the President himself may exercise his
prerogative as Commander in Chief to declassify specific information
in an address to the Nation or in a message to the Congress seeking
additional funds for weapons systems.262
Church’s unconcealed dejection transformed the uncertainty of his
continued role as chair into a partial victory.  After several minutes,
Church’s Democratic colleagues broke the silence with praise for both
Church and the Committee’s many accomplishments.263  Church ral-
lied his spirits and called for a Committee vote on presenting the 500-
page report to the full Senate for approval before its release.264  Send-
ing it before the Senate was a major concession to his Republican col-
leagues.265  The Committee voted unanimously to follow Church’s
proposed plan of action.266
Ironically, the Committee also voted, seven to three, to release its
report on the NSA’s SHAMROCK program, pending only a
favorable determination by the Senate Parliamentarian instead of be-
ing first sent to the full Senate like the Interim Assassination Re-
port.267  On November 5th, the Senate Parliamentarian ruled that no
Senate rule barred the Church Committee from presenting its SHAM-
ROCK report at the next day’s public hearing.268
During the hearing, Church publicly read the Committee’s report
on the SHAMROCK program, detailing how the NSA’s agreements
with various private companies provided them with American’s’ inter-
national telegrams from 1947 until May 15, 1975, when NSA Director
General Allen at the CIA terminated the program.269  Church de-
262. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PROTECTION OF CLASSI-
FIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  12 (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/secrecy/RS21900.pdf (quoting THOMAS M. FRANCK AND EDWARD WEISBAND,
SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 90 (1974) (statement of William S. Moorhead)).
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scribed the SHAMROCK program as “probably the largest govern-
ment interception program affecting Americans ever undertaken.”270
Despite Church’s victory in alerting the public of such an invasive
and widespread domestic surveillance program, Tower voiced his
“firm opposition to this unilateral release of classified information.”271
Goldwater, unfavorably comparing Church to Pike, echoed Tower’s
criticism: “The fact that the other body, the House, seems to be irre-
sponsible in its treatment of the subject is no reason, in my opinion,
for the Senate to try to use that as an excuse for disseminating secret
material.”272  Defended by many of the Church Committee’s Demo-
crats, Huddleston replied to Tower and Goldwater, “[T]here has to be
a certain amount of knowledge made available to the public and made
available to the Congress before reasonable and meaningful legisla-
tion can be processed.”273  Such discourse reflected the Committee’s
partisan divisions as the senators stumbled towards a full session of
the Senate, where their disagreement would take center stage.
On November 20, 1975, the Senate convened in a rare secret session
to address the Church Committee’s Interim Assassination Report.274
Addressing the entire chamber, Church implored his colleagues to
“remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat
them.  If we do not, we will decline.  But if we do, our future will be
worthy of the best of our past.”275  Tower offered his counterargu-
ment, questioning “[a]t what point must the people’s right to know be
subordinated to the people’s right to be secure?”276
After an hour of listening to remarks by Church Committee mem-
bers, Michigan Republican Minority Whip Robert Griffin raised the
identical matter that provoked Church to threaten resignation from
the Committee on November 3rd: whether the Senate rules required a
majority of the Senate to release classified information provided by
the executive branch.277  Specifically, Griffin pointed to a portion of
Senate Rule 36 section 5, which provided the following:
Whenever, by the request of the Senate or any committee thereof
any documents or papers shall be communicated to the Senate by
the President or the head of any Department relating to any matter
pending in the Senate the proceedings in regard to which are secret
and confidential under the rules, said documents and papers shall be
270. Peter Fenn, Throwing America’s Privacy Under the Bus: Once upon a time in
Washington, lawmakers cared about invasions of privacy that are commonplace today,
US NEWS (June 6, 2013, 05:50 PM), www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-fenn/2013/
06/06/nsa-phonerecords-collection-signals-the-end-of-privacy.
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considered as confidential, and shall not be disclosed without leave
of the Senate.278
Mondale, brandishing the Senate Parliamentarian’s ruling
presented to the Church Committee in early November, clarified that
the rule only applied to “private communications” before the “Senate
as a whole.”279  Likewise, Mondale read from the Parliamentarian’s
ruling: “[M]atters that go routinely before committees, which are
often classified, can be released by those committees in their normal
function.”280  Further, Mondale advised against Griffin’s interpreta-
tion, warning that doing so would result in the following:
It will mean that whenever the executive branch wants to bottle
something up they will take a stamp out of the lower left-hand
drawer, stamp it “top secret” and send it to you classified.  It will be
a new Official Secrets Act of a kind we never had before.  It will
give the executive branch power they have never had before, power
binding not only upon the executive, but upon Congress itself.  It
will destroy Congress’ power and responsibility of informing the
public.281
While one may have thought Mondale’s eloquent rebuttal—sup-
ported in part by the Senate Parliamentarian—should have settled the
dispute by leading the Senate to accept his conclusion or alternatively
agree with Griffin’s interpretation, the Senate instead ignited into pro-
longed and heated debate.282  Fueling the Senate’s rage were two
facts: First, no one outside  the Committee had been provided an ad-
vanced copy of the Interim Assassination Report; and, second, the
prevailing view was that it would be leaked to the press with or with-
out a vote because it had already been printed.283
In disappointment, Huddleston expressed his frustration over the
Senate’s behavior, stating the following:
The whole purpose of coming before the Senate by the committee
was simply to inform senators so they would not read about the
report in the press before they had any knowledge of what it is all
about.  The unfortunate thing about this morning, of course, is that
we spent nearly the entire time debating the question as to whether
or not the Senate ought to vote or not vote on releasing the re-
port. . . . We went through an entire morning without ever having an
opportunity to answer one single question about the substance of
the report. . . .  It is unfortunate that the Senate today got hung up
on these questions which were not even pertinent to the whole ses-
sion today.284
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The Senate disobeyed the longstanding custom of showing defer-
ence out of respect to the work done by committees, as explained by
Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri just prior to the Church Com-
mittee members’ remarks: “[W]hatever the committee thinks should
be done with this report, I am going to be for.”285  Fortunately for the
fate of Interim Assassination Report, prior to the secret session
Church instructed his staff to hand out copies of the report to anyone
with press credentials immediately after it adjourned.286  Thus the
document became fait accompli because the Senate never had the
ability to alter its course.287
Unfortunately for the proponents of public disclosure, their victory
in the Senate’s secret session was ultimately overruled when the Sen-
ate created its permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.288  The
Senate passed an amendment offered by Senator Sam Nunn, a Demo-
crat from Georgia, which read that “[t]he Committee shall not pub-
licly disclose such information without leave of the Senate.”289
The failure of the Pike Committee was a harbinger of the signifi-
cance of the Nunn Amendment.Pike refused to yield to White House
requests for 250 deletions to the Pike Committee’s final report under
the auspice of national security, resulting in the report never being
published by the House.290  Instead, the report was leaked to a New
York City weekly publication, the Village Voice.291  Church “was
pleased about the stand the Pike [C]ommittee had taken on the rights
of a congressional committee to release classified information by ma-
jority vote: ‘If Congress permits itself to be gagged it ought to forfeit
its oversight function.’”292
Similarly, following the Senate’s passage of the Nunn Amendment,
Democrat Senator Gaylord Nelson of Nebraska criticized the measure
because it “undermine[s] our claim to be a coequal branch of the gov-
ernment.”293 Tower, earlier in a meeting among the members of the
Church Committee, stated the opposite view:
I believe Rule XXXVI of the Senate requires leave of the Senate
before disclosing matters confidential or secret under the rules. . . .
To do less would make every one of the more than 300 committees
and subcommittees of the Congress de facto equal of the
executive.294
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With the Interim Assassination Report’s release, a temporary vic-
tory for those favoring disclosure, the Ford Administration, likely
fearing the trove of secrets the Church Committee would attempt to
publish upon its conclusion, mustered a considerable critique against
the Church Committee,.  Most brazen of all was Kissinger’s speech to
the Economic Club of Detroit that rallied the audience by proclaiming
that “we cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be
dismantled.”295  He also called for termination of “the delusion that
American intelligence activities are immoral . . . and the illusion that
tranquility can be achieved by an abstract purity of motive for which
history offers no example.”296
Kissinger’s stinging rebuke of the Church Committee and its “ab-
stract purity of motive” was hardly a new argument for Church, who
had long been criticized by his colleagues for his “Sunday school” de-
meanor and was even nicknamed “Senator Cathedral” by those tired
of his relentless moralist tendencies.297  Earlier in May 1975, Kissinger
had reveled in his disdain for Church’s conventional moral judgments
while criticizing the Multinationals Committee’s investigation into
bribery of foreign government officials by multinational corpora-
tions.298  Kissinger surprisingly defended corruption abroad, stating
that “[b]ribery overseas was foreign policy, not domestic crime.”299
Despite the Ford Administration’s consistent barrage of criticism
and obstruction throughout the Church Committee’s existence,
Church employed various tactics to promote the Committee’s public
image.  The success of the Church Committee did not simply flow
from the Committee’s collective will to disclose information to the
public, but rather must be attributed to the strategic means by which it
tempered its opposition by refocusing attention towards the shocking
government secrets it exposed.
For instance, just before the Committee’s first public hearing on
September 16, 1975, the White House attempted to blunt the sting of
any of the Committee’s revelations by leaking various details to the
press.  Church responded by publicly announcing, ahead of the hear-
ings, that the “committee has evidence that quantities of biological
toxins of a highly lethal character have been retained by the CIA in
contravention of presidential orders that such material should be de-
stroyed.”300  Even with such early disclosures, the public was still
shocked by the details revealed over three days of testimony.301
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Church ensured that the CIA brought its lethal dart gun, which was
the cynosure of the press because it featured prominently on the front
page of the Washington Post the following day photos of the Senators
handling the weapon.302  The hearing also notified the public that the
CIA had “stockpiled substances that could induce smallpox, tubercu-
losis, sleeping sickness, and other diseases[ ], as well as to destroy
crops and livestock on a massive scale.”303  Likewise, testimony fur-
ther revealed that “[t]he CIA had also diffused through the New York
City subway system a ‘harmless simulant’ of a disease-carrying gas to
test the dynamics of the gas flow and the vulnerability of an under-
ground system to gaseous attack.”304
While revealing secrets could effectively garner media attention and
diminish obstructionist forces at play, Senators often shared too much
information or presented conflicting analyses when addressing the
press individually.  As stated earlier, Mondale and Church each em-
broiled themselves into controversy with their fellow Committee
members when they revealed too much information about assassina-
tion plots in early October.305  However, that incident was exacer-
bated by a prior incident with more partisan flare.
On July 20, 1975, Schweiker, appearing on Face the Nation, refuted
Church’s statement made on Meet the Press the previous day that he
believed, due to the testimony of the President’s brother, President
Eisenhower knew little of any assassination plots and “[t]he CIA may
have been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage.”306  Contra-
rily, Schweiker argued that the Committee lacked “any conclusive evi-
dence that exonerates the presidents.”307  During the Committee’s
following meeting on July 21st, Tower expressed his concern that such
statements reflect the sentiment that the Committee was “beginning
to polarize.”308  Due to the ire of the Senators leaking some of the
assassination plot details and the two Senators’ divergent theories of
responsibility, Baker suggested that the gag rule previously estab-
lished by the Committee be removed.309  To which Gary Hart re-
sponded: “[W]e must all keep our mouths shut.  I’ll quit this
committee if we all start talking out; it will tear us apart.”310
While the Church Committee never achieved unity in its voice or
politics, its members steered the Committee in the direction of public
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disclosure that would challenge Americans’ perception of their own
government, as well their own opinions.311  The off-scripted outbursts
of individual senators reveal the profound effect their membership
played in challenging preconceptions and altering the public’s percep-
tion of its government.
For instance, during one of the Committee’s public hearings on the
FBI’s efforts to discredit anti-Vietnam War protestors, Phillip Hart
struggled to reconcile his prior beliefs with the shocking evidence
before him:
I’ve been told for years by, among others, members of my own fam-
ily that this is what the [FBI] has been doing all this time. . . . As a
result of my superior wisdom in high office, I assured them that they
were on pot—it just wasn’t true.  They [the FBI] just wouldn’t do
it. . . .  What you have described is a series of illegal actions intended
to deny certain citizens their First Amendment rights—just like my
children said.312
As the Church Committee hearings delved further into the FBI’s
“2,370 actions between 1956 and 1971” recounting incidents where the
FBI “harassed and tried to destroy dissidents within the United
States,” it became clear that the “FBI had adopted the tactics and
techniques of the KGB.”313  As the Committee reviewed the FBI’s
astonishing plot to blackmail Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and induce
him to commit suicide, Mondale concluded, “apart from direct physi-
cal violence and apart from illegal incarceration, there is nothing in
this case that distinguishes that particular action much from what the
KGB does with dissenters in [the Soviet Union].”314
Further Phillip Hart raised a broader point during the FBI hearings:
It is right that the committee and the press be worried about the
treatment of a Nobel Prize winner, Dr. King; but there are an awful
lot of people who never get close to a Nobel Prize whose names are
Jones and Smith, that my review of the files show had violence done
to their first amendment rights.  Nobel Prize winners will always get
protection, but Joe Potatoes doesn’t, and the committee should fo-
cus on him, too.315
After the last of the Church Committee’s public hearings and the
near demise of the Pike Committee, dispirited, Church assessed the
media’s coverage, stating that “the issue has become how to keep
secrets rather than how to preserve freedom.”316  Despite his disap-
311. Id. at 129 (citing Interview with Frederick Baron, Washington, D.C., (Dec. 4,
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pointment in negative perceptions of the Committee’s work, his ear-
lier victory in the secret Senate session in November 1975 permitted
the Church Committee to publish its reports before the Senate consid-
ered the Nunn Amendment.  The Church Committee, exercising its
authority to publish reports on its own, worked with the executive
branch to satisfy a majority of its members to publish the most com-
prehensive reports on the intelligence community in the history of the
Unites States.317
V. WILL THE CHURCH COMMITTEE REMAIN THE APOGEE OF
COMPREHENSIVE CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT?
Church, reflecting on the establishment of the permanent U.S. Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence, envisioned variance in Con-
gress’s assiduousness in conducting future intelligence oversight:
Today, continuing congressional surveillance is built into the wood-
work.  We did the necessary job.  Political will can’t be guaran-
teed. . . .  We did that knowing that the Congress being a political
animal will exercise its surveillance with whatever diligence the po-
litical climate of the time makes for.318
Church’s astute observation emphasizes the political realities either
acting to invigorate or enervate congressional intelligence oversight.
President Obama’s call for congressional cooperation in his proposed
government surveillance program reforms, which he announced on
January 17, 2014, tasks Congress with reaching a consensus where
agreement is sparse.319  While Congress must reauthorize the bulk col-
lection of telephone data by summer 2015 in order for that program to
continue, congressional opposition continues to mount.320  However
such opposition is not merely delineated by party lines, as demon-
strated by McCain’s reaction to the President’s speech in which Mc-
Cain urged Congress to act because, in his view, “[i]t is more
important than ever for Congress to exercise effective oversight and,
where necessary, to enact legislation to address these issues which are
vital to American national security.”321
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Even members of the congressional intelligence committees are di-
vided between support for current surveillance programs and privacy
concerns.  For instance, Republican Representative Mike Rogers of
Michigan and Senator Feinstein, the chairs of the House and Senate
intelligence committees, both support the government’s use of tele-
phone metadata to thwart terrorist plots and jointly declared that the
government’s bulk collection surveillance program is “legal and effec-
tive.”322  Yet three Democrats on the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence—Oregon’s Ron Wyden, Colorado’s Mark Udall, and New
Mexico’s Martin Heinrich—reacted to the President’s proposed re-
forms by praising the prospect of ending the “dragnet collection” be-
cause doing so “will go a long way toward restoring Americans’
constitutional rights and rebuilding the public’s trust. . . . Make no
mistake, this is a major milestone in our longstanding efforts to reform
the National Security Agency’s bulk collection program.”323
During a public hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence on January 29, 2014, Udall characterized Snowden’s disclosures
as engendering “a trust deficit . . . between the public and the intelli-
gence community.”324 Udall recalled that a similar climate of misgiv-
ing existed when “[t]his committee was created to address a severe
breach of trust that developed when it was revealed that the CIA was
conducting unlawful domestic searches.  The Church committee went
to work, found that to be true.”325  Upon Udall and Wyden asking the
intelligence directors a variety of questions related to the types of
searches conducted by the intelligence agencies, it became quite evi-
dent that a trust deficit remains between members of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence and the agencies’ directors.326
The recent disclosures surrounding the CIA’s acts of cyber espio-
nage on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence may ultimately
alter the political situation towards increased congressional over-
sight.327  However, partisan political realties remain quite evident in
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s final push to release its
report stemming from its investigation of the CIA’s interrogation of
suspected terrorists, which it began in 2009.328  The White House is
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also at odds with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence over
the declassification of the report’s content.329
The White House’s conflict with the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence over declassification presages that the public, even after
President Obama’s announcement, will remain skeptical of govern-
ment overreach and will likely support those advocating for reform.330
If Congress holds additional public hearings on intelligence agencies’
activities, it will be mindful of the many blunders during 2013 where
additional leaks from Snowden portrayed Congress as a body unable
to oversee the agencies.331  In the case of Director of National Intelli-
gence James Clapper’s erroneous testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, the public even witnessed its government
lying to itself.332  Such embarrassments only underscore the potential
political pitfalls surrounding ineffectual or misleading public hearings
on the activities of the intelligence agencies, particularly since
Snowden continues to reveal additional government secrets.333
Renowned journalists Dana Priest and William M. Arkin argue that
another political reality facing Congress today is the burgeoning ex-
panse of the intelligence industry, much of which consists of private
contractors.  Arkin estimates that “[o]f the 854,000 people with top
secret clearances, roughly 265,000 are not government employees;
they are contractors working at the for-profit companies whose bot-
tom line is to make money.”334  Priest and Arkin contend that “[t]he
motives of even the most conscientious, patriotic of these companies
is, by definition, self-interested when it comes to working with the
government.”335  The proliferation of government spending on private
contractors for intelligence purposes creates an analogous situation to
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2014).
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THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 179–80 (2011). See also id. at 158 (describing
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able to reinvest their earnings into lobbying activities to ensure their
survival.336
Although safety concerns following the 9/11 attacks instigated the
burgeoning intelligence community and its increased use of private
contractors, recent leaks prompted the public to reexamine the safe-
guards protecting individuals’ privacy against unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion.337  In searching for a new balance between safety and
security, judicial precedence will be an essential guide in guaranteeing
privacy protections.338
For example, in one of the earliest cases of domestic surveillance,
during prohibition, federal authorities relied on months of wiretapped
private telephone conversations to prosecute the “King of the Puget
Sound Bootleggers,” Roy Olmstead, and his bootlegging col-
leagues.339  In Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous dissent, he eloquently
described a right to privacy as the following:
[The Constitution’s framers] sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the
most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized
men.340
In 1967, the “right to be let alone” became the legal right to a “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy” as the Supreme Court in Katz v.
United States adopted Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead.341 Katz
involved the use of an electronic eavesdropping device attached to a
phone booth to gather evidence for prosecuting illegal gambling.342
These cases and their progeny continue to influence the debate sur-
rounding government oversight and the legality of the intelligence
community’s activities.343
Despite the political realities facing Congress today, the Church
Committee’s ability to withstand vehement opposition provides ample
guidance for those interested in pursuing more comprehensive con-
336. Gary Hart, The Intelligence-Industrial Complex, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20,
2013, 01:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/the-intelligenceindustria
_b_3473283.html.
337. See PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 334, at 3–6.
338. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Is the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Program Con-
stitutional?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/geoffrey-r-stone/is-the-nsas-bulk-telephon_b_4538173.html.
339. Edwin T. Hunt, Prohibition: A Film by Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, PBS, http:/
/www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/media_detail/2082733861-olmstead/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
340. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
341. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (adopting J. Harlan’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test).
342. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49.
343. See Stone, supra note 338.
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gressional intelligence oversight.  The Committee’s Chief Counsel
Schwarz believes that “[t]he Church Committee’s comprehensive in-
vestigation provides a starting point” for the question of “whether the
new threat [of terrorism] can be confronted without succumbing to
the same institutional pathologies that curtailed America’s freedoms
and undermined its values during the Cold War.”344
Fenn graciously offered his analysis and perspective on the contem-
porary relevancy of the Church Committee.  Fenn is one of the many
prominent voices advocating for another Church Committee, favoring
at the very least a presidential commission similar to the National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (“Simpson-Bowles
Commission”).345  In responding to some questions regarding the lo-
gistics of a new Church Committee, Fenn suggested that the central
question is “who you have lead those kinds of things, if it was a com-
mission or joint committee who would lead it.”346  Fenn believes both
Wyden and Udall most resemble Church, both being progressive ad-
vocates on national security issues and from western mountain states,
and would both serve as fine chairs for a future Church Committee.347
However, Fenn indicated that those strongly advocating for another
congressional committee akin to the Church Committee must realize
that such a move would be difficult because its creation would be “a
direct slam” against the two intelligence committees.348  Likewise, any
such committee or commission would require “very serious, seasoned
people both on the commission and its staffers . . . and you need a
serious budget.”349  In addition to the quality of those involved, Fenn
stressed that one of the greatest strengths of the Church Committee
was both the substantial time its members devoted to the Committee
and its small size.350  “If you’re on this committee you’ve got to spend
time yourself. There’s no excuses for not reading through this stuff.
You’ve got to do it. And Udall would do that. So would Wyden.”351
Fenn recalls that “the model for it at that time was the Watergate
Committee. What [Senate Majority Leader] Mike Mansfield thought
about what he created, the Church Committee was patterned a bit
344. SCHWARZ  & HUQ, supra note 21, at 47.
345. Interview with Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Comm’ns Grp., in Wash.
D.C. (Aug. 27, 2013); Conor Friedersdorf, Lawbreaking at the NSA: Bring On a New
Church Committee, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2013, 6:34 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2013/08/lawbreaking-at-the-nsa-bring-on-a-new-church-committee/
278750/.
346. Interview with Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Communications Group,
in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 27, 2013).
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after [the Watergate Committee].”352  Based on the time required for
the Watergate Committee and the Church Committee to finish their
respective tasks, Fenn estimates that a new committee or commission
could complete its work within a period of a year to eighteen
months.353
Fenn believes the focus of such a committee should revolve around
“what the FISA courts should or should not do, what kinds of collec-
tions you can have, what you need warrants for, [and] what you
don’t.”354  Fenn is concerned that “a lot of people, they just don’t have
an expectation of privacy anymore . . . and we’ve got to get that
back.”355  He is mindful that “technology is not going to go retro,” but
rather new technologies pose considerable questions about people’s
expectation of privacy.356  Fenn believes that although “people don’t
have this innate fear that they themselves are going to be put under
this, but they get that this is a highly intrusive technology that can be
used in the wrong way and they’re now nervous about it.”357
Fenn critically rejects the government’s argument that “[w]e have it
all but don’t really look at it.”358  He counters that “[i]f you’ve got it
all—you are looking at it.”  Further, with the advance of technology,
Fenn questions whether “DNA [will become] the new fingerprint?”359
And if so, the ability to store such personal data will only improve as
collection “technology is going to increase by leaps and bounds.”360
Today U.S. companies are being forced to comply with requests for
information regarding both their domestic and international custom-
ers.361  After all, Google and Facebook have international clients to be
concerned; corporations now have several economic reasons to op-
pose intelligence gathering.362  Fenn suggests that the notion that the
government can ask hotels for its guests lists or go to communications
companies and acquire their data provides companies with hard busi-
ness and economic reasons to oppose such government actions, “aside
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He hopes that this too would play a prominent role in a future Church
Committee.364
At his core, Fenn believes that “Church was trying to strengthen the
intelligence agencies not weaken them. He was trying to concentrate
on the stuff we should be concentrating on, which was the Soviet
Union and China—what’s going on internationally.”365  Fenn added
that Church was a “big believer in human intelligence and he thought
they were getting lazy and doing less of that stuff and they thought
they could get it all with a big vacuum cleaner in the sky.”366 And are
we not in the same situation today?  “Right, I think it’s totally the
same thing. . . .  I said, look, I said if you’re looking for a needle in a
haystack, look for the needle. Don’t spend all your time fussing
around with the whole damn haystack. I mean, you’ve got metal de-
tectors. Fine the needle”367  The increased dependence on massive
data collection stems from the booming intelligence budgets, and, ac-
cording to Fenn, one need only look at the money because “after 9/11,
whoever wanted to do something could do it. The money was all
there.”368
Moreover, another critical component to the Church Committee’s
success was its ability to gather documents from the executive branch.
Although Fenn appreciates that “Church was good at [gaining ac-
cess]” and was mindful that “these guys [in the Ford Administration]
hated Church. . . . [and] Dick Cheney was a different Dick Cheney
back then, but he hated Church then too.”369  Consequently, in order
to gain access to the government’s secrets, Tower and Goldwater were
instrumental.370  The Church Committee benefited from what Fenn
perceives as cooperation from “folks within the [intelligence] agencies
thought they had overstepped,” including Colby and General Al-
len.371  Fenn recalls that “Colby had a lot of respect for Church” and
“you have to remember, too, this is when [Nixon] had enemies lists . . .
and Henry Kissinger, Mr. Foreign Policy Guru now, he tapped his own
employees’ . . . telephones!”372  Fenn recounts that Allen’s coopera-
tion stemmed from Nixon telling him to do certain things which he
didn’t feel comfortable doing.373  Fenn believed that Vice President
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Nixon Administration, which fostered their cooperation with the
Church Committee.374
Fenn recognizes that in order for Congress to reprise its role as an
ardent overseer of the intelligence agencies, Congress must allocate
greater funding towards a serious investigative staff, at minimum simi-
lar to the size of the staff of the Church Committee.375  Fenn recalls
that “one thing about the Church Committee is that, and everybody
was appalled about it at the time, but we had about 130 people . . .
hard charging people.”  Fenn cannot imagine ever working with a
more talented group of people, commending in particular Schwarz
and Miller.376
The size of the Church Committee’s staff is astounding considering
that Priest and Arkin reported in 2011 that “the number of staffers on
[the House and Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence
and the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on De-
fense] has not grown much at all in the decade since the 9/11 at-
tacks.”377  In fact, Priest and Arkin reported that “[t]he number of
staffers with knowledge of and experience with the most costly and
technologically complex agencies, the National Security Agency and
the National Reconnaissance Organization, which manages multi-bil-
lion-dollar eavesdropping and spy satellite programs, actually
declined.”378
The ability of a future committee’s staff to acquire security clear-
ances would undoubtedly pose a substantial problem.  Fenn surmises
that if the Church Committee’s members had lacked the authority to
grant security clearances on their own, the intelligence agencies could
have derailed the Church Committee simply by denying the staff their
security clearances.379  Fenn recalls that the Church Committee
“struck an agreement with the agencies that they would perform the
background checks on all of the [Committee’s] staff folks and provide
that information to the Committee, the members, the senators, and
they would make the decision on the clearances.”380  Through this
process, Fenn “wasn’t aware of anyone getting turned down [for their
security clearance],” although he was nervous about acquiring a clear-
ance because of his 1972 anti-war demonstration activity in Califor-
nia.381  Additionally, he recalls that one intelligence staffer was fired
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rant.382  In terms of the ability of a future committee’s staff to be al-
lowed access to top secret materials by being issued security
clearances, Fenn firmly believes that the “committee has to make the
decision.”383
While the Church Committee was able to negotiate with the intelli-
gence agencies at the onset of its investigation, Loch Johnson com-
mented that throughout the duration of the Church Committee
“Congress never could seem to decide whether or not the major prob-
lem before it was how to curb intelligence abuses or how to maintain
secrecy.”384  Leaks from the Pike Committee ensured that when estab-
lishing the permanent intelligence committees in 1976, in Johnson’s
view, “a majority in the House (and no doubt many in the Senate) had
obviously become more obsessed with secrecy.”385
Imagining a current senator’s willingness to bargain for the privilege
of granting security clearances for staffers highlights the contrast be-
tween modern congressional intelligence oversight and the conduct of
the Church Committee.  Today, Congress has tied its hands by restrict-
ing its ability to self-disclose classified information.  When Wyden was
quoted in a 2013 Rolling Stone article disparaging secret laws, un-
truthful intelligence agency representatives, and the vast constraints
imposed on members of Congress, such statements only confirmed
Nelson’s prescient warning in 1976 that if Congress undercut its ability
to self-disclose classified information “[w]e undermine our claim to be
a coequal branch of the government.”386
Priest and Arkin describe secrecy’s isolating and frustrating effect
on those engaged in congressional intelligence oversight:
The leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, who
often were the only members briefed by the CIA on covert action,
were not allowed to consult with their lawyers or their specialized
staff members steeped in the issues, even if they had the appropri-
ate security clearances.  Instead, these members of Congress were
left on their own to make sense of highly technical issues such as
surveillance of fiber-optic cables in the Internet communications
grid structure, or the legal interpretations, history, and nuances of a
particular regulation in the law governing electronic searches and
seizures.387
Priest and Arkin’s summary echoes Wyden’s sentiment that “[t]here
are very significant limits [on what you can and cannot say], and they
382. Id.; E-mail from Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Communications Group,
to Marc B. Langston, author of this article, (Feb. 12, 2014, 13:38 EST) (on file with
author).
383. Interview with Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Communications Group
(Aug. 27, 2013).
384. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 248.
385. Id.
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387. PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 334, at 23.
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are very cumbersome and unwieldy.”388 Schwarz contemplates se-
crecy’s dangerous quality when he considers that “[u]nderlying all the
Cold War abuses and excesses at home and abroad was the assump-
tion that the government’s role would remain forever secret.”389
Correspondingly, modern abuses ranging from enhanced interroga-
tion techniques to extraordinary rendition during the Bush Adminis-
tration remained secret from the intelligence oversight committees for
a period much too long.  For instance, Cofer Black, the former head of
the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, testified before a joint Senate
and House intelligence committees hearing, addressing his level of au-
tonomy in the “operational flexibility” in the methods he was author-
ized to employ in dealing with suspected terrorists.  He stated that
“[t]his is a very highly classified area. All you need to know is that
there was a before 9/11 and there was an after 9/11. After 9/11, the
gloves come off.”390
Priest vociferously reacted to  Black’s statement, questioning
“[w]hy was it up to this civil servant, no matter how well respected he
was among his colleagues, to decide what anyone else, even the
elected representatives he was addressing, did and did not need to
know about the deadliest enemy facing the United States?”391  She
continued:
It seemed almost un-American that a small group of people at the
White House and within the CIA could decide that only they should
know how the world really worked, while the rest of the citizenry
was expected to assume that they would figure out how to defeat
such an elusive foe all on their own, do the right thing, and then tell
the truth if they messed up.392
Priest’s reaction resembles the Church Committee’s similar declara-
tion that “power must be checked and balanced, and that the preser-
vation of liberty requires the restraint of laws, and not simply the good
intentions of men.”393  While the Church Committee represented the
end of what Loch Johnson described as the “Era of Trust” lasting from
1947–1974, the Bush Administration represented a brief time when
388. Janet Reitman, Q&A: Senator Ron Wyden on NSA Surveillance and Govern-
ment Transparency, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 15, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.rolling
stone.com/politics/news/q-a-senator-ron-wyden-on-nsa-surveillance-and-government-
transparency-20130815#ixzz2sHVXmsgR.
389. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 21, at 43.
390. Michael Kirk & Mike Wiser, Transcript: Top Secret America, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/iraq-war-on-terror/topsecretamerica/tran-
script-6/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (official transcript differs from actual statement
captured on video) (emphasis added).
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393. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 21, at 47 n.109 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-755, at v
(1976)).
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Congress arguably provided excessive deference when ardent congres-
sional oversight was needed most.
In contrast, the Church Committee’s final report reflected the true
achievement of comprehensive congressional oversight—that “[t]he
acts that the Committee exposed ‘did not reflect the ideals which have
given the people of this country, and of the world, hope for a better,
fuller, fairer life.’”394  Church’s moralist influence is particularly
prominent in the following section:
The United States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy.  Means
are as important as ends.  Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the
wise restraints that make men free.  But each time we do so, each
time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength
which makes us free, is lessened.395
Fenn believes the above quote accurately reflects Church’s belief
system: “[I]f the ends justify the means and you betray democratic
principles to defend democracy—that is an inherent contradiction that
will bring you down.”396  Fenn recalls, one just really felt like Church
was “doing the right thing.”397
The relevancy of the Church Committee is self-evident in the fol-
lowing observation made by Church on the Committee’s enduring his-
torical significance:
[T]here is no more pernicious threat to a free society than a secret
police which is operating beyond the law.  Reports in the press sug-
gested that the intelligence agencies were operating in violation of
the law.  If these abuses had not been uncovered and had the agen-
cies gone unchecked, we might well have seen a secret police de-
velop in the United States.  Once that begins, the Constitution itself
is in very real danger.398
Some would argue the same threat exists today, but the question
remains whether Congress is capable or willing to engage in compre-
hensive intelligence oversight comparable toconsubstantial as the
Church Committee.
VI. CONCLUSION
The debates surrounding the proper role of Congress in overseeing
intelligence agencies represent a full spectrum of persuasions.  The va-
riety of ideas culminating at the origin of the permanent intelligence
oversight committees shatters the notion that the executive branch has
394. Id. at 47 n.110 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-465, at 285 (1975)).
395. Id.
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398. SMIST, supra note 133, at 35 (quoting Interview by Frank John Smist with Sen.
Frank Church (Apr. 25, 1983)).
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always enjoyed or deserves as much deference as it occupies in rela-
tion to intelligence activities or declassification.
If reigning in the intelligence community, in particular ensuring
strict adherence to the rule of law, is a desirable goal, the history of
the Church Committee may contribute by serving as a model for con-
gressional intelligence oversight.  Although it is unfathomable that
Congress would entrust another committee with as much authority as
the Church Committee or that the executive branch would offer simi-
lar levels of cooperation, the Church Committee represents an alter-
native to executive deference and furnishes Congress with a working
model to rediscover effective intelligence oversight.
In reviewing this Article, Fenn shared the following:
I often say [in] these days of ideological polarization that back then
[the Church Committee] was extremely polarized ideologically—
with the leading liberals of the senate and the leading conserva-
tives—yet they managed to work together, to actually get the job
done. Hard to imagine such an effort today!399
In Loch Johnson’s review of this Article, he concluded that Fenn’s
remarks are exactly on point.400  Perhaps the most frustrating aspect
of studying the history of Church and the Church Committee is the
longing for history to manifest itself again.  Although the Church
Committee remains controversial to some, it was undeniably thor-
ough.  The political courage of its members, in both parties, was as
astounding then as it is today.  Despite divisions among its members,
consensus prevailed on most of the major issues before the
Committee.
Church led the Church Committee to conduct an unprecedented
investigation of intelligence agencies, yielding myriad controversial
secrets.  His experience in opposing the executive branch over issues
such as the Vietnam War encapsulated his requests for cooperation
with a formidable coating of confidence.  Just as Watergate had pro-
vided the political will to create the Church Committee, Church har-
nessed the secrets of the intelligence agencies to precipitate sweeping
reforms and ensure permanent congressional intelligence oversight.
By reviewing this Article’s brief summary of Church’s political
background and key aspects of the Church Committee’s work, one
hopefully gleans a model for congressional intelligence oversight that
is a persuasive alternative to the status quo, wherein congressional in-
telligence oversight committees defer heavily to the executive branch
and offer few protections against government misconduct.  As Church
399. E-mail from Peter Fenn, Founding Partner, Fenn Communications Group, to
Marc B. Langston, author of this article, (Feb. 12, 2014, 13:38 EST) (on file with
author).
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EST) (on file with author).
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envisioned, “Congress being a political animal will exercise its surveil-
lance with whatever diligence the political climate of the time makes
for.”401  The recent shortcomings of congressional intelligence over-
sight committees may spawn a renewed interest in returning to a less-
deferential posture.
401. SMIST, supra note 133, at 81 (quoting Interview by Frank John Smist with Sen.
Frank Church (Apr. 25, 1983)).
